Human Rights

Climate-focused environmental assessment: Key to protecting human rights

In a landmark ruling for climate justice in Latin America, on June 16, Costa Rica’s Constitutional Court ordered the government to include a climate impact analysis in the assessment of any project, construction, or activity that could affect the environment.The decision builds on similar achievements in other countries on the continent, resulting from strategic climate litigation.The ruling in Costa Rica was the result of litigation supported by AIDA, in which we filed a legal brief presenting solid arguments demonstrating that incorporating a climate perspective into project assessments is an obligation under national legislation, international agreements, and the experience of other countries in the region.Since the climate crisis is the most urgent environmental and human rights threat the world currently faces, it is important for courts to uphold the requirement that governments assess climate-related risks and impacts before authorizing any project or activity.The procedure established to conduct this analysis—known as an environmental impact assessment (EIA)—is specifically designed to identify, anticipate, analyze, mitigate, and/or prevent the environmental impacts of potentially harmful projects or activities.At the same time, it is a key tool for preventing development proposals from violating the rights of individuals and communities, including the universal right to a healthy environment.Below, we detail the reasons why governments must assess a project’s climate impacts before giving it the green light—these were our contributions to the recent legal victory in Costa Rica. National and international obligationsThere are several national regulations that establish the obligation to include climate change criteria in project environmental assessments. In Costa Rica, for example, we have:The Manual of Technical Tools for the Environmental Impact Assessment Process calls for taking climate factors into account, particularly regarding the vulnerability of rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water, as well as the life they sustain.Decree 42465 of 2019, which requires institutions carrying out public infrastructure projects to assess climate risks, climate change, and other natural or human-induced factors at all stages of the project. Our brief also refers to a series of documents that analyze climate risk in Costa Rica, a country that, due to its location in the Central American tropics, is exposed to extreme weather events—hurricanes, tropical storms, droughts, and floods—whose frequency and intensity have increased as a result of global warming.A nivel internacional, Costa Rica, al igual que otros países del continente, es parte de tratados y otros instrumentos del derecho internacional que implican obligaciones en materia de ambiente y derechos humanos que hacen referencia a la evaluación ambiental de proyectos:United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It requires governments to use appropriate methods, such as project impact assessments, to minimize the adverse effects of climate change on the economy, public health, and the environment.Paris Agreement. It requires governments to take and report on the actions they will undertake to reduce climate-damaging gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, all of which must respect human rights.Convention on Biological Diversity. It requires countries to implement appropriate procedures to ensure that projects likely to have a significant adverse impact on biological diversity are assessed, with a view to preventing or minimizing such impacts, and to allow for public participation where appropriate.Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. It calls on countries to develop, strengthen, and implement relevant actions to align sustainable development and growth, food security, health and safety, climate variability and change, environmental management, and disaster risk reduction.Advisory Opinion No. 23 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It requires that environmental assessments of projects take into account their cumulative impacts, prevent harm to indigenous communities and tribal peoples, include contingency and mitigation plans, and ensure that the assessments are objective, independent, and subject to state oversight. Lessons from other Latin American countriesIn several countries on the continent, the requirement to incorporate climate criteria into environmental assessments has been institutionally established and also upheld by court rulings. Two recent cases illustrate this:Chile. In a 2022 litigation related to the Mejillones thermal power plant, located in the Antofagasta Region, the Supreme Court ordered Chile’s Environmental Assessment Service to analyze the atmospheric component—including those elements that have changed in the terrestrial environment due to climate change—from the start of the project’s implementation to the present.Colombia. In response to a lawsuit challenging the country’s environmental permitting regulations, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2024 that environmental impact studies must include an assessment of climate change impacts: “a global phenomenon determined by multiple biophysical and socioeconomic variables that interact over long periods of time, which is having an increasingly decisive effect on natural processes and impacts territories, communities, and individuals in different ways, with Colombia being one of the most affected countries.” Protecting a healthy environment in the face of the climate crisisAs noted above, incorporating climate change criteria into the environmental assessment of projects is essential for the enjoyment of the right to a healthy environment. This implies:Assessing the impacts that the project or activity may have on climate change. This includes quantifying and documenting direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions; determining whether, and to what extent, these emissions increase or decrease; and analyzing appropriate mitigation strategies to address anticipated impacts.Considering the effects of the climate crisis (such as climate-induced accidents or disasters) on the development, viability, and sustainability of the project or activity over time, this analysis should inform the decision on its authorization. The climate crisis is not a threat, but a reality that is already severely affecting the region. In this context, it is imperative that development projects continue to undergo proper environmental assessments that require mandatory, systematic consideration of climate impacts for both mitigation and adaptation. Through strategic litigation, AIDA will continue to contribute to this effort. Learn more in our fact sheet, "Climate Change Perspectives in Environmental Impact Studies" (in Spanish). Check out our report, "Global Best Practices for Environmental Impact Studies" (in Spanish). 

Climate justice unlocked

How the Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion 32/25 Rewrites the Rules for Climate Litigation in Latin America. This article was originally published on Verfassungsblog. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has just handed climate litigators in Latin America the most powerful tool they have ever had. Advisory Opinion OC-32/25, issued in 2025, does not merely interpret existing rights in the context of the climate crisis. It restructures the procedural architecture of climate litigation by inverting burdens of proof, authorising the presumption of causal links between state emissions and climate harm, and recognising satellite imagery as evidence that states must make accessible to victims. For organisations that have spent years fighting for communities on the front lines of the climate emergency, this is not an incremental development. It is a transformative moment.The Opinion did not emerge from a vacuum. Over the past decade, the Inter-American Court has built the foundations step by step. In 2017, Advisory Opinion OC-23 established the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous right under the American Convention – not a derivative entitlement, but a freestanding legal guarantee with its own independent status. That standard moved from theory to practice in the contentious case of La Oroya v. Peru, where the Court found that severe environmental contamination created a systemic risk to life, health, and physical integrity. OC-32/25 is the third step in this trajectory – and by far the most ambitious.The Opinion characterises the climate crisis as a human rights problem that falls disproportionately on those already marginalised. It maps the vulnerabilities of Latin America and the Caribbean with precision, identifying Central America, the Amazon, the Caribbean and the Andes as zones of existential risk. The figures the Court cites are sobering. In 2021, the region counted 17.1 million internally displaced persons due to climate-related causes. The top one per cent of the population generated 92 per cent of per-capita CO₂ emissions in 2019, while the bottom 50 per cent generated just 0.27 per cent. Those who emit the least suffer the most.  Across these ecosystems, indigenous peoples and traditional communities are disproportionately affected by ongoing violations of their rights linked to climate change. A New Autonomous RightFrom the right to a healthy environment, the Court derives a new autonomous right: the right to a healthy climate, defined as the right to live in a climate system free from dangerous anthropogenic interference. The Opinion treats this right as an indispensable precondition for the exercise of all other human rights in the context of the climate emergency. States are accordingly bound by a standard of heightened due diligence. Climate governance is no longer treated as a matter of political discretion alone. States must prevent climate harm inside and beyond their borders, require environmental impact assessments to include specific analyses of greenhouse gas emissions before authorising projects, and set ambitious, progressive reduction targets calibrated to the best available science. The scientific consensus reflected in IPCC assessments is explicitly treated as the legal reference standard.The Court adds a prohibition on regression: protection levels already achieved are a floor, not a ceiling. It extends due diligence obligations not only to states’ own activities but also to companies operating under their jurisdiction. These propositions are not entirely new, but the Opinion consolidates them into a unified framework and gives them the authority of a definitive Inter-American interpretation. For litigation purposes, the catalogue of obligations is now largely settled. Procedural Rights as the Real InnovationIf the substantive obligations are important, the procedural innovations are transformative. The most significant contribution of OC-32/25 for climate litigation is not the declaration of a right to a healthy climate – it is the way the Opinion restructures the access rights framework. Indeed, the Court developed two very valuable elements: the right to science, and standards of proof and evidence that strengthen climate litigation. "The right to science includes access to the benefits of scientific and technological progress and to the co-production of knowledge between scientists and holders of local, traditional and indigenous knowledge." (par. 473) The right to science, grounded in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and read together with OC-32/25, creates enforceable obligations for states to guarantee effective access to scientific climate knowledge. States can no longer rely on claims of scientific uncertainty or insufficient knowledge: policies must be based on the best available science and updated as that science evolves. Environmental impact assessments (par. 362), national adaptation plans (par. 388), and Nationally Determined Contributions are treated as auditable documents that must rely on scientifically credible evidence and remain transparent (parr. 510, 511 and 486). Most significantly, judges can and must evaluate whether the scientific basis relied upon by the state satisfies Convention standards (parr. 488–539). This substantially expands the scope of judicial review of climate policy within the Inter-American system. Reversing the Burden of ProofProving a direct causal link between a specific state’s emissions and a specific harm has historically been the single greatest obstacle in climate litigation – technically demanding, judicially contested, and practically out of reach for most affected communities. OC-32/25 dismantles that obstacle in four concrete moves.The Opinion acknowledges that climate litigation is characterised by marked asymmetries between parties in their access to technical and scientific information. National courts must therefore adopt measures – including the reversal of the burden of proof – to guarantee effective judicial protection. The language is direct: "the burden of justifying any denial always falls on the State" (par. 490). In matters of information access passivity is not an option for the state.Second, the Opinion accepts a presumption of the causal nexus between a state’s greenhouse gas emissions and the degradation of the global climate system, and in turn the link between that degradation and the risks facing people and ecosystems – provided this is anchored in IPCC assessments. This responds directly to the attribution problem that has shaped the limits of climate litigation for decades. Courts are no longer required to resolve the full scientific chain of causation in each individual case.Third, the Opinion introduces alternative standards of proof. Access to climate justice does not require proving individualised causation for each harm. It is sufficient to demonstrate the generation or tolerance of significant risks through state inaction, and the effective exposure of people or groups to those risks. Communities do not need to show that a specific tonne of CO₂ from a specific state caused their specific flood. They need to show that they were exposed to foreseeable risks that the state failed to address.Fourth, the Court highlights satellite evidence as particularly relevant in climate cases and requires states to ensure cooperation and technology transfer to make such evidence accessible to victims in judicial proceedings. This is a practical recognition that the evidentiary tools needed for climate litigation are often technically sophisticated and economically inaccessible to the communities that need them most. What Changes for LitigationTaken together, these four innovations transform the strategic landscape for climate litigation across the Americas. Organisations like AIDA can now challenge fossil fuel projects whose environmental impact assessments fail to incorporate adequate climate analysis – invoking the right to science directly. We can contest state climate policies on the grounds of scientific insufficiency or obsolescence. We can bring cases on behalf of entire communities without proving individual, direct harm, thanks to the broad standing the Opinion recognises. And we can defend indigenous territories by connecting climate damage to collective territorial rights through a framework that no longer demands the near-impossible standard of individualised causation.OC-32/25 is not a self-executing judgment. Its standards will need to be invoked, argued, and developed case by case before the Inter-American Court, the Commission, and national courts across member states. Resistance from states that seek to preserve the status quo is predictable. But the architecture is now in place: the applicable rules have changed.At AIDA, we have spent years litigating in a region where the gap between states’ formal climate commitments and the actual protection experienced by communities is vast. OC-32/25 gives us legal instruments to narrow that gap. It does not ask us to be more optimistic. It asks us to be more ambitious – in the cases we choose, in the standards we invoke, and in the connections we draw between international law and the communities on the front lines of the climate crisis. 

Pre-COP31 sessions in Bonn: A worn-out climate system with glimmers of hope

By Florencia Ortúzar Greene and Karla Maass* The world has been negotiating on climate change for 30 years. For 30 years, governments have been meeting annually, accompanied by increasingly alarming scientific reports. The multilateral process has matured; it now has implementation rules and mechanisms in place to drive global climate action, but that action remains limited and discretionary.What's going on? How can we breathe new life into this very important global process?The following are our reflections after participating in the 64th Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held June 8–18 in Bonn, Germany, to advance negotiations leading up to the 31st UN Climate Change Conference (COP31). The stalemate in international climate negotiationsIt would be unfair to say that the sessions in Bonn were a failure, let alone to be surprised by the lack of concrete results. What is happening is simply a reflection of a process in slow decline. This becomes evident at a time when there is sustained and widespread talk of the need for “implementation” and “cooperation” to put the Paris Agreement into effect, while, time and again, two irreconcilable rifts continue to block progress. Being able to identify them so clearly brings a certain sense of reassurance.The main point of contention remains financing. Developing countries consistently raise in negotiating rooms that the Paris Agreement not only sets targets for emissions reductions and adaptation but also establishes concrete commitments for financial support from developed countries. However, discussions on the provision of financing are completely stalled. This is happening in a context where commitments are not only insufficient but also inadequate in quality, accessibility, and predictability.In response to this demand, developed countries have placed increasing emphasis on mobilizing private capital and creating enabling conditions for investment. Although these flows can play an important role, private investment tends to be directed toward sectors and projects with clear financial returns. Meanwhile, critical areas such as adaptation, loss and damage, and capacity building continue to depend on concessional public financing. Added to this are structural debt-related issues that ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in countries already struggling to cope.The second point of contention relates to phasing out fossil fuels. For several States Parties, the willingness to embark on phasing out fossil fuels is not on the table. This is despite the fact that they are signatories to the Paris Agreement ad, at COP28 in Dubai, agreed to move toward a just, orderly, and equitable transition away from fossil fuels. There is talk of a just transition, but plans to expand fossil fuel use are as certain as they are concrete. The role of science in addressing the climate crisis has been sidelined One cause for concern at SB64 was the intention of representatives from various countries to downplay the role of science in climate decision-making. This is nothing new. It has been happening for years, gradually and steadily—perhaps so slowly that we hadn’t noticed it until now.This phenomenon became evident when contrasted with the results of the First International Conference on the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels, held recently in Santa Marta, Colombia. There, science served as the common thread and central foundation of the political dialogue. The way science was given a platform reminded us of how it was handled at the early COPs, which opened with presentations of the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Today, that no longer happens. These days, science appears as a second-rate guest, with a contested and unclear role.This is extremely important because, without science, the process loses its foundation and becomes a purely political negotiation, in which the side with the most power wins. Climate action: A new wind of hopeThis story doesn't end on a completely bleak note. At the climate talks in Bonn, some encouraging developments took place—the result of this long and complex process.The Brazilian COP30 Presidency took on the task of developing roadmaps to transition away from fossil fuels and to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030, thereby reinforcing the two central pillars of any effective and reliable climate action. This demonstrates leadership willing to break away from the official path to make progress.In addition, at COP30, it was agreed to implement a just transition mechanism (known as BAM), a decision that responded to the urgent call from civil society and affected communities. And in Bonn, countries made progress in implementing it. While there is still much to be done, the process is still on track and will be finalized at COP31, to be held November 9–20 in Antalya, Turkey.Furthermore, the Santa Marta Conference—organized within the framework of COP30 and bringing together 57 countries willing to discuss the energy transition—succeeded in launching a renewed process of dialogue, which is also an undisputed source of hope that will continue to grow stronger as we look ahead to the second conference, to be hosted by Tuvalu and Ireland. Learn more in our review of the SB64 (in Spanish). *Florencia Ortúzar Greene is the director of AIDA's Climate Program, and Karla Maass is an external consultant for the organization. 

The impact of "critical" minerals in Latin America

A just energy transition: A necessary and feasible path

Toward the phase-out of coal in Latin America

The Xingu River is being silenced, but not its people

A river is always a path, sustenance, and memory.  At the Volta Grande (or Great Bend) of the Xingu River, deep in the Brazilian Amazon, the water did more than just flow: it taught people when to plant, when to fish, and when to celebrate.  There, life moved to the rhythm of the river.  But that began to change in 2010, when plans were underway to build the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant, and a silent question began to grow: Who decides the fate of the water?  Six years later, on May 5, 2016, when the dam was inaugurated, nearly 80% of the Xingu River’s flow had been diverted.As early as 2018, organizations and communities were warning that the flow management plan imposed on the Xingu River for the operation of the hydroelectric plant foreshadowed a future of drought.That warning has come true.Today, entire stretches of the river are dry. More than 100 kilometers of the Volta Grande have lost their natural flow. The water, which once sustained biodiversity and local ways of life, no longer flows as it once did.  Without enough water, the fish have stopped reproducing. There has been no spawning for three years.  The river’s silence has turned into hunger, uncertainty, and disruption.  The death of the fish is not just an environmental impact: it is the breakdown of a way of life.  Indigenous, riverine, and fishing communities have lost not only their primary source of food but also their autonomy and their connection to the land.  Today, the legacy of Belo Monte is a growing accumulation of ecological, social, and cultural degradation.  However, this story is not yet over. Time for justice for the Xingu River and the life it sustainsTen years after the Belo Monte Dam began operations, the reported impacts have been confirmed, but something unexpected has also grown stronger: resistance.The affected communities remain organized, active, and determined. They continue to speak out, demand reparations, and defend their right to live alongside the river.That strength is evident today in the protests against new projects in the area.Because for these communities, the struggle is not just against a project; it is for the survival of their way of life.Today is a moment of justice for them.  The complaint against the Brazilian State for its international responsibility in the case has been before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights since 2011, pending a decision that could mark a turning point for the communities of the Xingu Basin.  The complaint contains the legal and evidentiary elements necessary for the Commission to admit it, determine that there were several human rights violations, and refer the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose ruling could set a precedent for state regulation of megaprojects in the context of the climate crisis; public participation; and the protection of indigenous peoples, traditional communities, and key ecosystems such as the Amazon.But as the process moves forward slowly, the impacts continue to worsen every day. The urgency is not legal; it is human. Every unanswered cycle is another cycle of drought, biodiversity loss, and mounting violations.    In this case, making a decision is not just an institutional matter; it is a matter of life expectancy for those who depend on the river.What happened with Belo Monte has become a symbol.  It is a clear example of how projects marketed as “clean energy” can have profound and lasting impacts when they disregard human rights.  At a time when the world is seeking energy solutions to address the climate crisis, we cannot repeat old patterns of injustice.  Learn More 

Santa Marta and the End of Fossil Fuels: From “Yes” to “How”

The First International Conference on the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels has concluded in Santa Marta, Colombia. And all signs point to this initiative being here to stay.Many aspects deserve attention in this process launched by Colombia and the Netherlands. Are we witnessing the first step toward a new era?While the world is still processing what has happened and awaits the official report from the co-hosting countries in the coming months, we offer an early analysis. The OriginsThe Santa Marta conference was a response to the frustration caused by three decades of international climate negotiations—at the successive Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—failing to directly address the primary and undisputed cause of the climate crisis: fossil fuels. And it was about time.Since 1992, the international community has negotiated emissions targets and market mechanisms without ever facing the elephant in the room. The words "oil," "coal," and "fuels" do not appear in the Paris Agreement. It wasn’t until 2021, at the Glasgow COP, that fossil fuels were acknowledged for the first time as causing climate change, but only a gradual reduction in coal was called for. In 2023, in Dubai, the greatest progress was made: the phrase "transitioning away from fossil fuels." And in 2025, in Belém, not even that could be maintained. But at least that frustration helped spark the Santa Marta conference, which was precisely the opposite: 57 countries representing a third of global GDP sat down to discuss how to phase out fossil fuels, not whether to do so. If it amounts to nothing more, this conference was at least a relief, a sign of sanity in a world that sometimes is truly hard to understand.And the discussion wasn't just about the "what," but also the "how," which includes justice. The official summary document circulated by the host countries discusses territorial plans for a just transition, labor restructuring with the participation of workers and communities, direct access to financing for indigenous peoples, and explicit prevention of "new forms of extractive dependency." Decentralized and community-based energy systems are mentioned as concrete examples of sustainable production.At AIDA, we believe this is a fundamental condition: without justice, there can be no viable transition. It is not merely an ethical or legal imperative; it is also a practical one. When the transition is carried out without involving communities, without safeguarding people and territories, and without a fair distribution of burdens and benefits, it generates resistance that can hinder the projects themselves. The evidence in Latin America speaks for itself.In times when humanity is going through such darkness, it is hard to be optimistic. Perhaps in this case, there are reasons to be so. A war that, paradoxically, shows the way forwardWith the war in the Middle East as a backdrop, the Santa Marta conference took on an unprecedented sense of urgency: the disruption to oil and gas supplies that it has caused puts us in a unique situation. Overnight, between 20 and 25% of the world’s oil and gas flow was cut off, wreaking havoc across the globe: skyrocketing living costs, blackouts, and faltering economies. A conflict in one specific part of the world is affecting nearly every economy on the planet.And that shifted the tone of the conversation. The transition is no longer framed solely as a climate or environmental necessity, but as a matter of security and sovereignty. The war demonstrated that relying on fossil fuels makes us tremendously vulnerable. It is time to recognize that the climate emergency and economic stability are on the same side—they are not at odds.Fatih Birol, director of the International Energy Agency, stated from Santa Marta that the war "has broken fossil fuel markets beyond repair," referring to the metaphor of the broken vase. This is not merely an environmentalist position; it is a global assessment. The Revitalization of Santa MartaIn addition to its content, the way the Santa Marta conference unfolded was also surprising and could be considered a breakthrough in climate diplomacy.The fossil fuel lobby was explicitly excluded. Countries that have historically blocked any progress were not invited. And the format of the high-level segment broke with traditional dynamics: instead of the computer-read statements that characterize COPs, ministers and delegates sat in small circles under Chatham House rules, without screens, alongside representatives of civil society and indigenous peoples under the same conditions. It didn’t happen at the end, when no one is listening anymore, but rather by setting the tone from the very beginning.Tzeporah Berman, chair of the initiative to establish the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, described the experience as "watching a dam break": "All that accumulated experience, knowledge, and passion suddenly translates into concrete steps to phase out polluting fuels." Science at the WheelAmong the concrete outcomes, the launch of the Scientific Panel for Global Energy Transition (SPGET) stands out. In the early years of climate negotiations, science led the way: COPs opened with an update on the latest scientific findings, and decisions were built upon that foundation. Over time, this approach eroded. Countries with fossil fuel interests gradually diluted scientific warnings and introduced what was openly called “false solutions” at the Santa Marta conference—such as carbon capture and offsets—to justify continued extraction. The conference set out to put science back in the driver’s seat.The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) continues to produce essential reports, but it has limitations that the SPGET can address. It publishes reports every seven years, a slow process for a crisis that is accelerating. Its summaries for policymakers—which, in practice, are read by governments—are negotiated line by line with government representatives, including those from countries with fossil fuel interests, diluting the conclusions. And the IPCC is not authorized to make policy recommendations to countries. Carlos Nobre, one of the founders of the SPGET, recounted that he once sought to include information on the risks facing the Amazon in an IPCC summary, but a representative from his own country rejected it.The SPGET is completely independent. No government can veto its findings, and it will produce annual updates with concrete policy recommendations to support countries in developing roadmaps aligned with the 1.5°C goal. In terms of its structure, it is co-chaired by a Cameroonian economist (Vera Songwe), a German economist (Ottmar Edenhofer), and a Brazilian energy engineer (Gilberto Jannuzzi). If it works as promised, it could become the scientific arm that the transition needs. Continuity and Structure: A Commitment to the FutureThe Santa Marta conference was not a one-off event, but rather the start of a structured process. To begin with, a second conference has already been confirmed for 2027, co-hosted by Tuvalu and Ireland, cementing the commitment to North-South collaboration. With this in mind, three permanent working groups have been established that will continue their work until the Tuvalu conference.The first line of work will support countries in developing national transition roadmaps aligned with their climate commitments under the Paris Agreement. There are concrete examples: France presented its own roadmap to phase out fossil fuels from its energy mix by 2050—the first proposal of its kind submitted by a developed country. But the plan has been criticized by civil society. It does not address the remediation of territories damaged by decades of extraction, nor does it account for the new pressures that its electrification model could exert on the Global South, from which the vast majority of the minerals needed for batteries, grids, and renewable energy come.Colombia, for its part, presented its own plan at the academic pre-conference, with data showing that the transition would become economically viable starting in 2040.Unlike the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), these roadmaps address fossil fuel production. The NDCs focus on reducing emissions, but they do not commit to closing coal mines or power plants or ending tenders for fossil fuel extraction. However, NDCs also have something that roadmaps lack: legal standing, as they are part of the Paris Agreement. Thus, the promise lies in integrating roadmaps into NDCs, which would result in concrete and binding transition commitments. But, as the French case shows, if the roadmaps do not incorporate the remediation of affected territories or the supply chains that electrification demands, there is a risk of ending up with binding commitments that reinforce an unequal transition rather than correcting it.The second ongoing line of work will address financial barriers—debt, fossil fuel subsidies, and access to capital—with support from IISD, a research center specializing in subsidy policies and climate finance. And the third will seek ways to decarbonize international trade by connecting fossil fuel-producing and -consuming countries so they can work together on the transition, with support from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).In addition, there is the Scientific Panel (SPGET), which will provide the technical foundation for the entire process, and a permanent coordination group between the current co-hosts (Colombia and the Netherlands) and the future co-hosts (Tuvalu and Ireland) to ensure continuity. Everything that emerges from these lines of work will inform the official UN climate negotiations, including COP31, scheduled for November of this year in Turkey.Although there are no binding agreements to show for it, we already have concrete working mechanisms in place among the countries committed to moving forward, including supporting institutions, clear mandates, a second conference to review progress, and a commitment to influence official UN negotiations. It’s a good start, with a structure that sustains itself. What Remains to Be ResolvedThere is one issue that cuts across all of the above: timelines and urgency. We have only just begun discussing roadmaps to phase out fossil fuels, but their implementation should have begun 40 years ago. That delay should set the tone for everything that lies ahead.One area where the Santa Marta conference fell particularly short is financing. The issue—debt, fiscal space, subsidies, and the international financial architecture—was discussed at length, but this failed to translate into clear signals. For a process aimed at coordinating the global phase-out of fossil fuels, the absence of a financial roadmap is a serious limitation.This is nothing new, nor is it a matter of charity. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, enshrined in the UNFCCC itself, establishes that the countries that contributed most to the climate crisis must support those that contributed least and are suffering the most. On this basis, climate finance targets have been set, currently amounting to USD 300 billion annually by 2035, as agreed at COP29. But most of that financing comes in the form of loans, which means that countries in the Global South are taking on debt to solve a problem they did not create. The North’s climate debt to the South paradoxically becomes the South’s financial debt to the North. Thus, a just transition is not possible. And the Santa Marta conference failed to make any progress on this issue.Another structural barrier that was addressed in Santa Marta but still requires further work is the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which allows fossil fuel corporations to sue governments for adopting climate measures. At least $100 billion in compensation has been awarded to companies through international arbitration tribunals. ISDS was included in the official summary of the Santa Marta conference, but with lukewarm language. As long as governments can be sued for billions for closing a coal mine, the transition will not move forward—not for lack of will, but out of fear of lawsuits.Nor was the debate over natural gas as a "transition" fuel resolved. The official document acknowledges that "there were differing perspectives regarding the role of transition fuels and technologies"—a step forward achieved thanks to pressure from civil society, given the number of countries that openly promote gas as a solution. But gas is a fossil fuel, and methane leaks from it exacerbate global warming. Presenting it as a "transition" fuel only deepens dependence and delays the transition.Finally, an analysis from Latin America reveals a significant practical inconsistency: the gap between what countries say and what they do. The Mexican government actively participated in the conference while also establishing a committee to assess the viability of "sustainable" fracking. The Brazilian government, guardian of the Amazon, continues to auction off oil wells. And Colombia, host of the conference, announced that it seeks to expand the extractive frontier in the Caribbean Sea. It seems that different branches of the same government are acting with entirely contradictory objectives. The problem is that this undermines the credibility of the process, which is crucial for a coalition such as the one being sought.That said, perhaps it was too much to expect that the first conference of its kind—which sought and succeeded in laying the groundwork for a new process—would provide all the answers to the crisis of our times. The Santa Marta conference served to identify the problems, establish lines of action, and build trust. The next step cannot wait much longer. By the 2027 conference in Tuvalu, there should be no unresolved issues left, especially regarding financing. A plan without financing, no matter how good or well thought out it may be, cannot get off the ground. From a Coal Port to a Sinking Island The conference in Santa Marta, a major coal port in Colombia, has come to a close, and the next stop is Tuvalu, a small Pacific island nation facing an existential threat from rising sea levels. The route is symbolic: from a country that exports coal to one that is disappearing due to the global warming caused by burning that very coal. That these two nations are now working together to lay the groundwork for a change in course is precisely what we need: to acknowledge the past and look to the future with solidarity.The First International Conference on the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels could go down in history as the cornerstone of a new era. Let’s keep building on this foundation. 

Ten years of Belo Monte: The time for justice has come

Ten years after its inauguration, the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant (UHE) in Pará returns to the center of public debate, this time under the scrutiny of the Inter-American Human Rights System. More than an anniversary, this milestone reinforces the urgency of an effective institutional response:justice cannot continue to be postponed.The case, currently pending before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), brings together a substantial body of evidence regarding human rights violations associated with the Belo Monte UHE. Filed by a coalition of civil society organizations, including the Inter-American Association for the Defense of the Environment (AIDA), Global Justice, Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira (COIAB), Movimento Xingu Vivo para Sempre (MXVPS), and the Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI), the petition consolidates allegations of violations of the rights to life, health, prior consultation, and a healthy environment. The case is at an advanced stage of review and could soon  be referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.A decade on, the socio-environmental impacts remain significant and largely unmitigated. The Volta Grande do Xingu—a stretch of approximately 130 km directly affected by the artificial reduction in river flow—represents the project’s most serious liability. The alteration of the hydrological regime, compounded by extreme events associated with climate change, has compromised local ecosystems, disrupted the reproductive cycle of species, reduced navigability, and threatened the food and water security of populations that depend directly on the river.Indigenous communities, riverine populations, and artisanal fishers face the ongoing deterioration of their ways of life, including reduced fish availability and impacts on fishing livelihoods. Additional harms include inadequate resettlements, increased violence, mental health impacts, and threats to cultural practices and traditional  ways of life.Unlike the debates that characterized the project’s implementation phase, today’s discussion is shaped by the climate emergency and new international regulatory standards. Advisory Opinion OC-32 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights provides clear guidelines on states’ obligations to protect human rights in the face of the climate crisis, recognizing the right to a healthy environment as a foundational principle. In this context, the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant case is a significant test of how   energy development, environmental protection, and the  rights of local populations can—and must—be reconciled.The organizations monitoring the case highlight non-compliance with precautionary measures issued by the Commission as a key reason to advance to the Court. The legal merit of the case, combined with its international significance, positions the case as ready for adjudication."More than a decade after the start of the Belo Monte hydroelectric project, the impacts on the Xingu River continue and are worsening, exacerbated by pressure for new projects and the climate crisis. The communities remain mobilized for justice and confident in the Inter-American Commission’s efforts to bring the case before the Court—the final step to ensure full reparations and the protection of the territory and its ways of life," said Marcella Torres, legal coordinator of AIDA’s Human Rights Program.According to Melisanda Trentin, coordinator of Socio-Environmental and Climate Justice at Justiça Global, the Belo Sun mining project is moving forward in the Volta Grande do Xingu region with consultation flaws identical to those of the Belo Monte project. “What is at stake in the region is the accumulation of harm and violations of human and environmental rights. A river with reduced flow, communities facing food insecurity and altered ways of life, and now a new project that repeats the same violations denounced in the Inter-American System for over 10 years,” she points out.For the signatory organizations, the ten-year mark represents a critical window for justice. The Belo Monte case is no longer an isolated episode— it stands as a benchmark for the concrete application of environmental justice in the Amazon, amid growing climate pressure and demands for state accountability.ABOUT - Belo Monte is the fourth-largest hydroelectric power plant in the world, built on the Xingu River in the state of Pará, in the heart of the Amazon. With an installed capacity of 11,233 MW, it was inaugurated on May 5, 2016. Its operation diverts 80% of the Xingu River’s flow through a canal 500 meters wide and 75 km long. The flooded area between the canal and the reservoir covers 516 km², larger than the city of Chicago, of which 400 km² was native forest.#JutiçaNoXingu See the statement from the petitioners in the Belo Monte case before the IACHR Read what the petitioning organizations in the case have to say:Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB)"There is no legal certainty without respect for the inherent rights of indigenous peoples. In the Amazon, this defense goes beyond the legal realm: it is a commitment to life, to the integrity of territories, and to the planet’s climate balance. The harm that the construction of the Belo Monte Dam has caused to indigenous populations and the environment has become a reality and is irreversible. COIAB’s Legal Advisory Office works to ensure that the Constitution, international treaties, and the self-determination of indigenous peoples are effectively respected at all levels of decision-making," states Gabriele Baré, coordinator of COIAB’s Legal Advisory Office.Movimento Xingu Vivo Para Sempre "Belo Monte uprooted people from the riverbanks and scattered the Xingu people far and wide, away from the river, their community, and the daily life they knew and loved. The riverine dwellers ceased to be who they were; the fisherwomen ceased to be who they were; they became nothing, many of them wandering the outskirts of cities. These people lost their identity and, with it, their soul. All that remained was emptiness and loneliness. The impact of the loss of their way of life cannot be compensated, but it must be acknowledged so that some form of redress can be made," says Ana Laide Barbosa, an educator with the Xingu Vivo para Sempre Movement.Observatory of Isolated Indigenous Peoples (OPI)"The construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam has exacerbated threats and pressures on the indigenous peoples of the Middle Xingu region in a manner similar to what occurred during the dictatorship with the opening of the Trans-Amazonian Highway in the same region. Recently contacted peoples such as the Parakanã and the Arara have suffered from alarming rates of invasions and illegal deforestation on their lands, and the refuge of the isolated indigenous groups of Ituna Itatá has become one of the most deforested areas in Brazil. At the same time, the diversion of the Xingu River’s waters causes ecocidal damage to the indigenous peoples of Volta Grande; and harmful impact compensation policies have had disintegrating and ethnocidal effects on nearly all the peoples. “For all these reasons, the hydroelectric dam has become yet another example of the colonial relationship established by the Brazilian state with the Amazonian peoples and a debt of reparation that must be acknowledged and addressed," says Helena Palmquist, deputy coordinator of the Observatory of Isolated and Recently Contacted Indigenous Peoples (OPI). 

Open letter: Ten years since Belo Monte

BELO MONTE: TEN YEARS OF OPERATION, MORE THAN A DECADE OF UNREPAIRED DAMAGE On May 5, 2016, the first turbine of Belo Monte began operating on the Xingu River. Ten years later, the Indigenous, riverine, and artisanal fishing communities along the middle Xingu River—who were never properly consulted—continue to suffer systematic violations of their rights. The balance of this decade is not one of development; it is one of documented harm and denied reparation.The impacts are concrete and persistent. More than 100 kilometers of the Volta Grande do Xingu have lost their natural flow. The operational hydrograph imposed by the plant does not guarantee the minimum ecological conditions necessary for the reproduction of aquatic life, causing the collapse of artisanal fishing and severe food insecurity for populations that depend on the river as their main source of food and income. The loss of access to the river also entails a loss of culture, territory, and rights.Isolated and recently contacted Indigenous peoples present in the region face heightened risks, as their survival depends directly on the environmental and territorial integrity of the Xingu River. This context imposes an enhanced duty of protection on the State, in accordance with constitutional and international standards.The climate crisis exacerbates each of these violations. The extreme droughts that struck the Amazon in 2016, 2019, 2020, 2023, and 2024 worsened existing impacts and exposed the project’s structural fragility. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), in Advisory Opinion 32/25, recognized that ecosystems such as the Amazon are critical to climate stability and that States have an obligation to act with enhanced due diligence to prevent serious and irreversible damage to these territories and to the communities that depend on them.Since 2011, the case has been under consideration before the IACHR and is awaiting an admissibility and merits report. The evidentiary record is complete. The violations are documented, continuous, and unrepaired. The passage of time is not neutral — each lost piracema (the seasonal spawning cycle on which fishing communities depend), each family displaced from the river, each new threat to the region adds to a human cost that is real, growing, and inexcusable.For their part, the riverine and Indigenous communities of the region, both in the Volta Grande do Xingu and its surrounding areas, have not stood idly by. While they fight for full reparation, they work toward the establishment of riverine territory and the expulsion of intruders from Indigenous lands; they organize environmental and territorial monitoring of the river, document impacts, and resist each new threat to their territory. This documentation is not advocacy — it is evidence. It forms part of the legal record and unequivocally demonstrates the continuity of the violations.These are ten years of operation and more than fifteen years of documented violations. We expect the case to be admitted by the Commission and submitted to the IACtHR without delay and that, in an act of justice, it recognize the responsibility of the Brazilian State and require the adoption of an ecological hydrograph that guarantees minimum conditions for the reproduction of life in the Volta Grande do Xingu; the establishment of riverine territory; full reparation for affected communities; the suspension of new high-impact projects in the region while existing damages are not remedied; and the ordering of effective guarantees of non-repetition. The communities of the Volta Grande do Xingu have waited long enough.Signed by the petitioners:Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA); Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI); Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB); Diocese of Altamira; Justiça Global; Xingu Vivo Para Sempre Movement; Observatory of Isolated Indigenous Peoples (OPI); and the Pará Society for the Defense of Human Rights (SDDH). Download the letter