Human Rights


Barco que transporta carga en el mar
Climate Change, Human Rights, Oceans

The future of shipping is at stake: What is being negotiated at the IMO?

Shipping moves a large portion of the products we use every day. But it also accounts for about 3% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Along with air travel, it is a sector where reducing emissions can be difficult because it requires a global agreement.In a previous post, we discussed how the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency that regulates maritime transport, was negotiating measures to decarbonize the sector. Since then, there have been both progress and setbacks. Today, that discussion has reached a decisive moment. An unprecedented, historic agreementIn 2023, IMO member states agreed on a strategy to reduce emissions from shipping and achieve net-zero emissions by around 2050, with a commitment to promote a fair and just transition. They also set medium-term reduction targets—based on 2008 emissions levels—of at least a 20% reduction by 2030 and a 70% reduction by 2040.To translate these objectives into specific rules, in April 2025, during the 83rd session of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 83), the text of the Net-Zero Framework (NZF) was adopted. Its design combined two tools:A technical measure to require that the fuels used by ships become progressively less polluting, promoting the use of zero- or near-zero-emission alternatives and establishing increasingly strict annual emission reduction targets.An economic measure that requires payments from ships that exceed certain emission limits. This measure proposed creating the Net Zero Fund so the funds raised can be used to encourage cleaner technologies and support measures for a just and equitable transition. The agreement marked an unprecedented step forward that would increase the cost of using traditional marine fuels, such as HFO (heavy fuel oil), thereby encouraging the use of less polluting fuels and allowing the resources raised to support less developed countries in the transition.However, in October 2025, during MEPC 83, when the agreement was due to be formally adopted, intense political pressure surrounding the climate ambition of the Net Zero Framework and its implementation led to the discussion being postponed for a year. The NZF was not definitively adopted amid disagreements over its costs, implementation, and economic component.What happened in 2026?In April 2026, during the MEPC 84 sessions, the States agreed to create a new forum to discuss outstanding concerns and seek a broader consensus. To this end, two meetings of the IMO Intersessional Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Reduction (ISWG-GHG) were scheduled.The first meeting was held from September 1 to 4 (ISWG-GHG 22), and the second will take place in November, in conjunction with MEPC 85. Although the first meeting saw a willingness to engage in dialogue and agreement on some technical aspects, significant differences remained among the various groups of countries, and no new version of the NZF was agreed upon. Some countries are seeking to relax and make the emission reduction targets less stringent, in addition to limiting or eliminating all types of payments and incentives to comply with the mechanism, thereby significantly reducing the possibility of a just and equitable transition in maritime shipping.The discussions at ISWG GHG 22 make it possible to identify, with reasonable clarity, two approaches: one that seeks to maintain the structure of the MEPC 83 agreement and ensure that the regulations effectively accelerate the shift toward lower-emission fuels and meet the climate goals set by the IMO; and another that seeks to incorporate the pace of the current fuel market—based on availability, scalability, and price—into the decarbonization strategy, thereby allowing for the continued use of fossil fuels, such as liquefied natural gas, as transition fuels in the maritime sector. There are two main points of debate in the negotiations: a. Determining how much and at what rate GHG emissions from ships should be reducedThe NZF proposes a global standard that progressively limits the amount of GHGs generated per unit of energy used by ships. To calculate this, it accounts for fuel emissions throughout its entire life cycle, from production to use on board (well-to-wake). This prevents alternatives that pollute along their value chain before reaching the ship from being presented as clean.Some proposals from countries seek to make the initial targets more flexible or to link their requirements to the availability, affordability, and scalability of fuels. Advocates for these proposals point out that the transition requires investments, infrastructure, and technologies that are not yet sufficiently available in all regions. While these challenges are real and inherent to the process, weakening the targets does not appear to be the most appropriate solution. This would be counterproductive, as it would further delay investment in new technologies, prolong the use of fossil fuels, and make it harder to meet climate goals. The solution must allow for viable implementation without losing sight of the goal of effectively reducing emissions from the international fleet. b. Deciding who pays for pollution and who receives supportThe second debate centers on the NZF’s financial mechanism. Under the version approved in 2025, ships that fail to meet certain performance standards must make financial contributions. These funds would go toward the IMO’s Net Zero Fund, which is designed to support the use of less polluting fuels and finance measures for a just and equitable transition in vulnerable countries.Specifically, Regulation 41 stipulates that a portion of the revenue collected should fund measures that support a just and equitable transition, promote environmental and climate protection, and support adaptation and resilience, with a focus on the needs of developing countries.This regulation also addresses financing for research and development of new technologies, the development of maritime and port infrastructure, technology transfer, capacity building, and technical cooperation among countries. In addition, it provides support for workers in the maritime sector and seafarers; the implementation of national action plans, including fleet modernization and renewal; and measures to address the disproportionate negative impacts that new measures may have, for example, on food security.Although many countries support this revenue-generation scheme, others seek to eliminate mandatory payments and the Net Zero Fund. Liberia and Panama propose replacing them with a system of emissions credit trading among ships, where financial transactions would take place primarily within the maritime industry. For its part, Japan proposes that shipping companies, rather than contributing to a common fund, fulfill their obligations through direct contributions to projects they select themselves, subject to IMO approval. Brazil proposes a middle ground: maintaining the collection and redistribution of resources through a more flexible financial entity (Facility).The paradox is that without a stable, predictable source of funding that sends the right signals, it is much harder to reduce CO2 emissions and support countries with fewer resources in adapting. Incentives for businesses or a more flexible, gradual transition do not, on their own, guarantee that decarbonization goals will be met or that the benefits of the transition will reach the countries and communities that need them most. While it is currently estimated that the NZF would raise between $11 billion and $12 billion annually to incentivize decarbonization and finance a just transition, alternatives that eliminate centralized revenue collection would concentrate the economic benefits within the companies themselves, without guaranteeing resources to support the most vulnerable countries. What's at stake for the countries of Latin America and the CaribbeanFor the region, these decisions are not a distant concern and require decisive action to ensure that decarbonization delivers climate benefits—not just economic costs. Many countries rely on maritime transport to import food, medicine, and energy, or to export their products. In addition, the region produces fossil fuels and needs economic incentives to adapt its energy systems to the new demands of maritime transport—particularly in ports—while enabling countries to remain competitive and comply with IMO regulations. The need for regional ports to adapt to the risks associated with the climate crisis must also be considered.Weakening the agreement will not ensure that the region is integrated fairly and equitably into the IMO’s decarbonization process. The energy and fuel transition is already underway—at varying speeds—and the most developed countries are investing in infrastructure and technical capabilities, paving the way to secure their participation in the sector’s future and the process's benefits and opportunities.However, Latin America and the Caribbean’s participation in the transition is at stake. Without an agreement establishing a clear framework to support the transition of developing and least developed countries, as outlined in Regulation 41, there is a real risk that the region will be sidelined and its countries will bear the costs of the transition. This is because many countries face constraints in undertaking energy investments in the maritime sector, and it could take years for them to become suppliers of clean fuels.Reaching a robust, fair, and equitable agreement at the IMO will not only accelerate the reduction of polluting emissions. It will also make the transition possible for countries around the world, leaving no one behind.A fair agreement should address both climate challenges and the needs of countries undergoing the transition. In particular, it needs to:Have clear and ambitious goals that will reduce the sector’s pollutant emissions with the necessary urgency and without indefinitely delaying technological change.Provide sufficient funding to enable countries with fewer resources to address the disproportionate impacts of regulation and invest in new technologies, technical capabilities, and port infrastructure.Protect people and the environment so that the production of new fuels and the transformation of ports respect the rights of workers, coastal communities, and indigenous peoples. The region therefore has an active role to play. Its governments can advocate for policies that combine climate ambition, environmental protection, international cooperation, and safeguards for a just and equitable transition, rather than accepting that there is a choice between protecting the economy and protecting the climate. A decisive end to the yearIn the coming months, negotiations at the IMO will enter a critical phase that could shape the agreement's future and determine whether discussions continue to be postponed or a final text is adopted. From November 23 to 27, the ISWG-GHG 23 meetings will be held; from November 30 to December 3, MEPC 85 will take place; and on December 4, the extraordinary session (MEPC ES.2) postponed in 2025 could resume, if the Committee confirms it.Reaching a global agreement with common rules will provide greater clarity on the sector’s future and prevent individual countries or regions from moving forward on their own. But adopting an agreement is not enough. Its success will depend on whether it effectively reduces polluting emissions, accelerates the phase-out of fossil fuels, and mobilizes sufficient resources to support the countries facing the greatest challenges.At AIDA, we will closely monitor these negotiations, advocating for the delegations from Latin America and the Caribbean to have an active voice, based on their legitimate interests and the best available technical expertise, not on political pressure.The challenge is to ensure that the transformation of shipping is both an effective response to the climate crisis and an opportunity to move toward a more just and equitable future for the region's countries. 

Read more

Paisaje de Antalya, Turquía, sede de la COP31 de la ONU sobre Cambio Climático.
Climate Change, Human Rights

COP31: The urgency of key discussions and conditions for accelerating global transformation

By Florencia Ortúzar Greene and Karla Maass* Against a backdrop of growing political fragmentation, geopolitical conflicts, and weakening international cooperation, the 31st UN Climate Change Conference (COP31)—to be held November 9–20, 2026, in Antalya, Turkey—represents an opportunity to strengthen multilateralism and collectively advance toward structural transformations based on justice, human rights, and the protection of ecosystems.In Latin America and the Caribbean, the context surrounding COP31 is characterized by the expansion of extractivism, the weakening of environmental institutions, and growing risks related to control over natural resources. Socio-environmental conflicts and threats to environmental defenders add to this. At the same time, dependence on fossil fuels continues to expose countries to geopolitical tensions, energy-market volatility, and risks to their economies and the security of their populations.Given this situation, COP31 must help rebuild trust in multilateralism through decisions that can accelerate climate action, overcome barriers to its implementation, and address the needs of countries in the Global South.At AIDA, we have identified four key processes for moving in this direction. Check Out Our Proposals. 1. Implementing a just transition mechanismOne of the main challenges at COP31 will be defining how to implement the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), agreed upon at COP30. Its transformative potential will depend on whether it moves beyond dialogue forums and, therefore, establishes inclusive multi-stakeholder governance focused on overcoming the structural inequalities that shape the transition, especially in the Global South.AIDA proposes:Governance: Ensuring the effective representation of rights holders in the mechanism’s governance bodies and technical forums. This should be achieved through a system modeled on the public representation provisions of the Escazú Agreement, ensuring the formal and ongoing participation of representatives from each stakeholder group recognized in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).Working methods: Establishing an ongoing process for collecting, organizing, and analyzing information that allows for the incorporation of the best available scientific evidence and the results of other international processes to guide the mechanism’s priorities and actions. We also propose coordinating with the Standing Committee on Finance to include a specific analysis of the resources allocated to a just transition in the first biennial monitoring report on the new quantified collective goal (NCQG) for climate finance, scheduled for 2028.Functions: Promoting a just energy transition that accelerates the phase-out of fossil fuels through exploitation-free zones—conceived as territories for life—and strengthening renewable and community-based energy alternatives. We also propose establishing socio-environmental safeguards for the extraction of “critical” minerals, based on human rights, ecosystem integrity, and strict criteria of necessity, traceability, and responsible use, to prevent the energy transition from reproducing new forms of extractivism. 2. Moving from funding promises to concrete actionsClimate finance remains a major point of contention in international negotiations. COP31 must make progress on implementing the Work Program on Climate Finance, placing developed countries' obligations to provide resources to developing countries at the center, in accordance with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.AIDA proposes:Scope: Ensure the program contributes to implementing the NCQG, particularly the target of at least $300 billion annually by 2035, through a roadmap that strengthens public financing by developed countries. Furthermore, we consider it essential to establish a specific mandate to assess the projected public financing needed to meet this target, drawing on the communications and processes established under Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, and to formulate recommendations and concrete measures for COP32.Working methods: Promoting innovative spaces for technical and political exchange that go beyond traditional dialogues and help identify solutions to structural barriers such as indebtedness, the high cost of capital, and difficulties in direct access to financing for indigenous peoples and local communities. We also propose strengthening coordination with the Diálogo de Veredas to build on its findings on reorienting international financial flows, without replacing developed countries' funding obligations. 3. A Global Stocktake to identify necessary changesCOP31 will mark the start of the second Global Stocktake (GST2) under the Paris Agreement. This process will assess collective progress on climate action and help guide international decisions in the coming years.AIDA proposes:Establishing specific measures to facilitate the collection and systematization of information from traditionally underrepresented stakeholders, particularly indigenous peoples and local communities, and providing the support needed to ensure their knowledge, experiences, and territorial solutions contribute to a more representative assessment.Establishing an open and inclusive feedback mechanism for the summary reports resulting from the information-gathering phase. This mechanism should allow for the submission of comments, the identification of information gaps, and an understanding of how the contributions received are incorporated.Ensuring that GST2 is grounded in the best available science, including the timely incorporation of the findings of the IPCC’s Seventh Assessment Report (AR7), and uses the commitments from the first Global Stocktake as a starting point for assessing their implementation, ensuring that climate justice, human rights, and ecosystem integrity are cross-cutting themes. 4. Accelerating the transition away from fossil fuelsNearly three years after the commitment made at COP28 in Dubai, its implementation continues to face significant obstacles, while plans to expand fossil fuel production persist. COP31 represents an opportunity to break this deadlock and build on international initiatives aimed at accelerating a just, orderly, and equitable transition.To this end, explicit political support from the COP31 presidencies for the roadmap promoted by the Brazilian presidency of COP30 and for the process launched at the First International Conference on the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels (Santa Marta) will be key, thereby strengthening their recognition and relevance on the international climate agenda.AIDA proposes:Formalizing and ensuring the institutional continuity of the Brazilian roadmap by incorporating it into the Antalya Political Package, and incorporating the results of both processes into the second Global Stocktake (GST2) to assess progress and gaps in implementing the commitment to phase out fossil fuels.We emphasize the need for the 35x35 electrification commitment to contribute effectively to reducing dependence on fossil fuels by promoting renewable energy, decentralized systems, and democratic, community-based governance models, with socio-environmental safeguards and an equitable distribution of benefits. Check Out Our Proposals.A COP31 focused on climate justiceThe climate crisis demands much more than new commitments. It requires transforming development models, international economic relations, and the cooperation and financing mechanisms that determine the actual scope for action by countries and their territories.COP31 offers an opportunity to move in that direction. Its significance will depend on governments' ability to make concrete decisions, strengthen international cooperation, and ensure that the necessary transformations are carried out with the effective participation of those who inhabit, defend, and protect these territories.In our proposals for COP31, we make specific recommendations for the four negotiation processes to contribute to climate action that is more ambitious, equitable, and centered on human rights and ecosystem integrity. Check Out Our Proposals. *Florencia Ortúzar Greene is the director of AIDA's Climate Program, and Karla Maass is an external consultant for the organization. 

Read more

Flamencos en una laguna altonadina en Bolivia

Who pays for the energy transition? Voices for justice from Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile

Alternative Raw Materials Week 2026 The expansion of lithium mining and the extraction of other minerals deemed "critical" for the energy transition—driven by the Global North, including the European Union—already affects, or threatens to affect, complex territories and entire lives in Latin America. At the heart of this problem lies the Gran Atacama region, a millennia-old complex of ecosystems on the border between Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, rich in natural life and culture, reduced by the mining industry to the label "Lithium Triangle."The impacts of this mining are not accidental. They result from economic and political decisions made from outside by governments, companies, and financial institutions. Those who live in the Gran Atacama not only bear the costs of an energy transition model they did not choose, but their perspectives are rarely considered.In this webinar, AIDA presented "Territories Under Threat: Lives Affected by the ‘Lithium Fever’ in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile," a multimedia and interactive website that amplifies the voices of communities defending their homes, culture, knowledge, and ways of life in the face of this new wave of extractivism. The website includes images, testimonies, stories, and various visual elements to reinforce a narrative that prioritizes life and serves as a tool for territorial defense. The website presentation was accompanied by remarks from representatives of organizations that defend human rights and the rights of nature in the Gran Atacama region. PanelYeny Rodríguez, AIDA: Welcome and Introduction.Víctor Quintanilla, AIDA: Presentation of the “Territories Under Threat” website and moderation.Veronica Gostissa, Pucará Assembly: Protection of Rights in Argentina.Vivian Lagrava, Empodérate Human Rights Collective: Protection of Rights in Bolivia.Antonio Pulgar, NGO FIMA: Protection of Rights in Chile. Recording (in Spanish) 

Read more

Cattle pass by a wetland in Catamarca, Argentina
Climate Change, Human Rights, Mining

A raw materials transition instead of a raw materials rush: Civil society calls for a change of course in raw materials policy

Berlin. From today until October 8th, more than 35 organizations from Germany and numerous other countries will share their perspectives at events on raw material extraction and global justice during Alternative Raw Materials Week. With 25 events on the circular economy, human rights, and environmental protection, the week is intended as a civil society intervention in current international raw materials policy. The highlight will be the Raw Materials Summit on October 6, 2026.While Germany and the EU are securing their supply of critical raw materials and pushing ahead with new raw materials projects, a broad coalition of civil society organizations warns against sacrificing environmental, human rights, and participatory standards in the pursuit of faster raw materials supply.Hannah Pilgrim, coordinator of the Raw Materials Working Group and initiator of Alternative Raw Materials Week: "The federal government is setting completely the wrong priorities with its raw materials policy. It cannot keep up in a race against China or the U.S. Instead, it should focus on a sustainable raw materials policy that prioritizes reducing external dependencies by cutting raw materials consumption and expanding the circular economy. To be taken seriously by raw materials-rich partner countries, it must defend hard-won standards in the areas of human rights and the environment.Through the Alternative Raw Materials Week, we bring together voices that need to be heard more clearly in the current debate: from mining regions, academia, labor unions, and international civil society.”Víctor Quintanilla-Sangueza, Content Coordinator of the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA): “European raw materials policy poses significant risks to the people of Latin America because of the serious environmental and social impacts associated with mining lithium, copper, and other raw materials. That is why we join critical forums for debate—such as the one facilitated by the Alternative Raw Materials Week—to amplify the voices of affected communities. We are countering the prevailing narrative of the energy transition with one that puts life at the center. We are questioning who is setting the rules for transition processes in the Global North and who is bearing the costs. We conduct this work in collaboration with communities and organizations in Latin America, including the Andean Wetlands Alliance”.During Alternative Raw Materials Week, various international guests from Argentina, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Portugal will be available for interviews. Here is a selection:Pía Marchegiani - FARN, ArgentinaNik Völker - MiningWatch Portugal Check the events calendarPress contactsAK Rohstoffe | [email protected] | + 49 (0)30 41 93 41 82Press | [email protected] | +49 1577 7764 847 

Read more

Agricultor en la región del Quinío, Colombia
Climate Change, Human Rights, Mining

A victory for climate justice: Colombia includes climate obligations in environmental impact studies

In Colombia, a case that began as a requirement for the coal sector ultimately became a regulation applicable to all projects requiring an environmental permit.This refers to the publication of the General Methodology for the Preparation and Submission of Environmental Studies, a regulatory "master key" that requires quantifying greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and including climate mitigation and adaptation measures in mining, hydrocarbon, energy, and infrastructure projects, among others.Colombia's Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development published this methodology in late July 2026, in compliance with a 2023 ruling by the Council of State.This important resolution was the result of a compliance action filed by a coalition led by AIDA and also comprising the "José Alvear Restrepo" Lawyers’ Collective (CAJAR), Censat Agua Viva, the Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP), POLEN Transiciones Justas, the University of Magdalena, and researchers.The new methodology for environmental studies represents a major step forward in protecting the right to a healthy environment and ensuring the right to a healthy climate through preventive measures.It also marks a victory for climate litigation in the region, demonstrating that the Colombian government failed to fulfill specific climate commitments and securing a ruling ordering one of the competent authorities to take concrete actions for proper climate management.Other countries in the region may replicate the strategy employed and the precedent set. A three-year path toward climate justiceIn May 2023, AIDA led a coalition of civil society organizations, think tanks, researchers, and a university that filed a compliance action with the Administrative Court of Cundinamarca. The goal was to demand compliance with laws related to addressing the climate crisis in the coal sector.In Colombia, neither environmental regulations nor climate change management regulations address GHG mitigation or the climate impacts generated by the coal sector, despite the significance of coal projects in the country and their role in exacerbating the climate crisis.Colombia is by a wide margin the largest coal producer and exporter in Latin America. In 2024, it accounted for 87.67% of regional production and 99.84% of exports, playing a significant role in its trade balance and its rail and port infrastructure. Furthermore, it ranks third in the region in terms of final consumption (24.52%), and in the last 12 months, nearly 5% of the country’s electricity was generated from coal.But without specific regulations, environmental authorities lack the tools to establish effective measures to prevent, mitigate, and manage the climate impacts of coal industry activity.The Administrative Court of Cundinamarca ruled in the coalition's favor in the first instance. The Council of State—the country’s highest authority on administrative matters—upheld the ruling on second instance. Consequently, it ordered the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development to comply with the obligations outlined in Law 1931 of 2018, which establishes the minimum actions the country must take to honor its international climate commitments.And this is where the case went beyond its initial objective: the ruling established a specific obligation for the ministry to regulate the consideration of climate impacts not only in coal sector projects but in all projects requiring an environmental permit. In other words, it includes the mining, hydrocarbons, energy, and infrastructure sectors, among others.This entails, among other things, quantifying GHG emissions from these projects and assessing how environmental offset measures can help Colombia meet its climate commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.The ruling also ordered the government agency to issue a resolution adopting the Mandatory Emissions Report, which would require major greenhouse gas emitters to report their total emissions annually on a disaggregated basis. Similarly, it ordered the agency to issue the environmental sector’s climate change management plan and coordinate actions with territorial climate change plans. A significant and reproducible rulingThe Ministry of the Environment’s publication of the methodology for environmental studies marks a milestone in environmental permitting by incorporating specific procedures to ensure environmental impact studies account for the climate impacts generated by projects seeking permits.It also focuses on environmental permitting and human rights, considers indirect emissions, and introduces new guidelines for assessing projects' environmental impacts.In addition, it sets a regulatory precedent that demonstrates, in practice, the climate unfeasibility of new coal mining and burning projects.In short, it is a regulatory instrument that seeks to close gaps in environmental permitting processes and strengthen the assessment of shortcomings associated with the climate impacts of certain projects, particularly in the coal sector. It incorporates a human rights perspective—a first within an environmental permitting process.Its scope is ambitious: stricter technical and climate management requirements would raise the compliance costs of coal-fired projects—making them more expensive than cleaner alternatives—and could support strategies to phase out coal as part of the country’s efforts to meet its climate obligations.The orders contained in the Council of State’s ruling do not end with the publication of the methodology. Other orders also seek to incorporate specific guidelines for climate change management.Among these is the Mandatory Emissions Report, a key tool for establishing processes to monitor, verify, and control the mitigation actions implemented by major greenhouse gas emitters. However, the ministry has published only a draft resolution adopting this instrument, which, if confirmed, would represent a unique regulatory advancement in the region with strong potential for replication.In other words, the Council of State’s ruling sets a very important precedent for the region for two reasons: it demonstrates that strategic litigation can lead to concrete regulatory actions to address the climate crisis, and it highlights the need to update regulatory frameworks to incorporate specific measures for climate change mitigation and adaptation in specific sectors and procedures.Therefore, it will be important to design strategies that allow both the litigation approach and the results achieved during implementation to be replicated in other countries in the region. 

Read more

Panel solar en una comunidad de Cuetzalan, México
Climate Change, Human Rights

Self-generation: How to democratize access to energy

In the traditional and dominant model, electricity is generated by large power plants and distributed through extensive grids that make up an electric power system. These activities are the exclusive domain of large electric companies, whether privately or government-owned.Therefore, the current energy system, based on fossil fuels—coal, natural gas, and oil—is not only one of the main causes of the global climate crisis, but it is also inequitable because it is concentrated in the hands of a few, in addition to limiting access to resources and public participation in decision-making.This requires that the energy transition involves not only a shift in the energy mix but also the creation of a new energy system that—among other things—enables democratized access to energy from clean, renewable sources.Energy self-generation, as a decentralized production model, is an opportunity to move in that direction. What does democratic access to energy mean?Energy is necessary for people to have access to better food, clean water, job opportunities, education, and other rights. Therefore, energy is also a right and a prerequisite for ensuring the enjoyment of other human rights.Energy democracy is both a principle and a movement that seeks to ensure that energy decisions—how it is generated, who generates it, and who benefits from it—are in the hands of the people rather than concentrated in the hands of large corporations or elites, prioritizing the use of clean and renewable energy sources as well as decentralized systems, with a focus on social justice.Therefore, democratic access to energy entails:Community control of energy resources.Citizen participation in energy planning.Equitable distribution of benefits. This contrasts with traditional centralized systems—often monopolistic—that have led to inequities, such as communities paying high electricity rates or suffering the impacts of large-scale electricity generation, yet having no say in the decisions that affect them.In Latin America, the active involvement of indigenous, rural, and traditional communities in energy projects is seen as a cornerstone for achieving a socially and environmentally just transition, closing energy access gaps, and strengthening energy democracy.In this regard, energy self-generation embodies energy democracy, as it allows entire communities to make their own energy decisions and reclaim control over key links in the electricity value chain, such as generation and management. What is energy self-generation?Self-generation is a decentralized model of electricity production that relies on locally available clean and renewable energy sources (such as solar, hydropower, or wind). This approach is used in projects that are often small-scale and can be used individually or collectively to meet energy needs in urban or rural areas, including those far from distribution grids.It is a model that enables progress, at the local level, toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions—which exacerbate the climate crisis—without repeating the extractivist model. It recognizes the right of communities to generate their own energy to meet their needs and, at the same time, helps reduce energy poverty and dependence on centralized power grids.Energy self-generation can take two forms:Distributed generation: A small-scale self-generation system connected to nearby distribution grids to feed surplus energy into the grid.Off-grid systems: A closed-loop self-generation system disconnected from distribution grids. In this model, users are no longer passive participants but instead play an active role in generating and managing energy wherever they are. A self-generating individual or community both produces and consumes energy. Examples of energy self-generation in Latin AmericaAcross the continent, success stories in implementing the self-generation model are strengthening the regional movement for energy democratization. Here are a few examples:Mexico - "Energy for the Yeknemilis (Good Living)." A community initiative implemented in the Northeastern Highlands of Puebla to promote local energy sovereignty through the installation of photovoltaic systems in community spaces.Colombia - Community solar project on Isla Fuerte. Installation of a solar microgrid with batteries (150 kW peak and 348 kWh of storage), not connected to the National Interconnected System, capable of providing continuous electricity to the 250 households on the Caribbean island.Brazil - Percília e Lúcio Renewable Energy Cooperative. A community initiative founded by the NGO Revolusolar and developed by residents of the Morro da Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Solar panels were installed there, reducing electricity rates by more than 50%.Chile - Curicó Electric Power Supply Cooperative. A community-based initiative operating in the Maule Region that installs solar panels to supply electricity to rural grids and community facilities. Challenges for energy self-generationDespite the progress made, the widespread and effective implementation of this model faces significant challenges on the continent. The main ones are:Inadequate regulation (complex or insufficient). Often, a country’s domestic regulations make it difficult or impossible to implement such schemes. This is due to limitations on the number of megawatts (MW) that can be generated, complex contractual requirements, or a lack of appropriate legal structures.Limited financing. Many low-income households cannot afford the upfront cost of solar panels or other technologies. Government support or loans for these projects are scarce. The risk is that self-generation will be concentrated among those with the financial means to implement it, thereby excluding the segments of the population most affected by energy poverty.Inefficient electrical infrastructure. Local grids often lack the capacity or technical capabilities to integrate energy generated by decentralized sources, limiting the ability to take advantage of surplus energy feed-in. Furthermore, the need for storage systems to address the variability of renewable energy sources, as well as the lack of grid backup, increases project costs. Energy self-generation: A solid path toward a just transitionThe pursuit of equitable access to energy through tools such as energy self-generation is consistent with the need to ensure that the energy transition puts people at the center and prioritizes improving their living conditions as its ultimate goal.Electricity generation models designed by and for communities are an important means of ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for everyone.Because discussing a just energy transition means reclaiming energy as a tool to meet human needs in the context of inequities and finite resources. Learn more about a just energy transition in Latin America.  

Read more

Encuentro de personas defensorar del ambiente del Cono Sur.
Human Rights

5 keys to collective action: Lessons from the meeting of environmental defenders from the Southern Cone

Can an energy transition be just if it repeats the harms of traditional extractivism?That was one of the central questions of “Articulando Territorios: Meeting of Defenders from the Southern Cone”, an event held on June 9 and 10 in Santiago, Chile, that brought together environmental defenders from Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.For years, AIDA has stood alongside those defending their territories against extractive and energy projects in Latin America. This meeting was part of that commitment: a space to share experiences, strengthen protection capacities, and collectively reflect on the impacts of the pressures of the global energy transition, including the rise of extractivism.Here are the five key lessons we took away: 1. Communities are at the heart of the resistance for a just and sustainable energy transitionMany of the activities promoted under the global paradigm of the energy transition—such as lithium, copper, and other “strategic” metal mining, as well as port megaprojects—aimed at decarbonizing the energy mix continue to reproduce the historical dynamics of intensive resource extraction. The experiences and lessons shared in regions such as San Antonio in Chile, Salinas Grandes and Vaca Muerta in Argentina, and the salt flats of Bolivia point the way toward environmental justice. Against this new backdrop—and amid a wave of extractive expansion—local communities are shifting from being areas affected by these projects to becoming strategic allies in the resistance movements of the Southern Cone. 2. Defending the territory is a project that encompasses all aspects of life and shapes one's identityBeing an environmental defender is not a temporary job or activity, but a true life’s work. From this perspective, territorial defense goes beyond the protection of a physical or economic space. It involves cultural identity, collective memory, spirituality, and the intrinsic “body-territory” relationship. This framework explains why the impacts on ecosystems cannot be measured solely in economic terms: they directly damage the social fabric through community fragmentation, the forced migration of young people, and the painful loss of ancestral practices. 3. Protection must be comprehensive, collective, and proactiveThe protection of those who defend the territory cannot depend on individual reactions or improvised measures when the risk is imminent. Protecting ourselves means identifying threats and strengths, and increasing our capacity to respond to risks. Building support networks, ensuring protection protocols are in place, and prioritizing collective care are the foundation for establishing robust processes for territorial and environmental defense. 4. Communication is about challenging narratives without revictimizingCommunication is a fundamental tool for political protection and strategic advocacy to counteract power imbalances. Communities must position themselves as primary sources of territorial knowledge and as the authors of their own narratives. Effective communication means bringing their knowledge, their proposals, and their capacity for organized resistance to the forefront, without reducing them to suffering or revictimizing them.   5. Recognize the right to defend the environment and use international tools as a means of protectionRecognizing that defending the environment is a holistic life project means recognizing and legitimizing the right to defend it. Territory and environmental defenders safeguard common goods that benefit society as a whole. It is necessary to explicitly recognize the legitimacy and dignity of this work by eliminating stigmas and criminalization, and by ensuring safe spaces for the exercise of this right.In this context, the tools of international law are part of the range of protective measures, including:Strategic litigation. The success and transformative value of strategic environmental litigation go far beyond simply obtaining a favorable court ruling. Its true potential lies in bringing silenced conflicts to light, generating independent technical evidence, and opening up political spaces—all of which occur when it is well coordinated with community-based organizational processes.Escazú Agreement. The Escazú Agreement is a fundamental regional framework thanks to the three procedural rights—access to information, participation, and justice in environmental matters—that it guarantees and upon which it is built. It is key to the active protection of environmental human rights defenders. This framework must be transformed into a tool for defense in the hands of communities, particularly through well-founded legal action and the activation of the mechanisms provided for in the agreement. The recent gathering of environmental defenders from the Southern Cone confirms something that AIDA has observed across the entire continent: the defense of the environment and human rights is built through networking.We will continue to stand with communities and environmental defenders in Latin America to ensure that the energy transition does not come at the expense of their territories and their lives. 

Read more

Campesino colombiano recorre la Sierra Nevada del Cocuy

Environmental law in Latin America: Progress and setbacks

Environmental law in Latin America is currently facing a paradox.The continent has recently seen historic progress in developing binding legal standards to protect the environment and those who defend it. However, this progress coexists with the weakening of legal and institutional frameworks for protecting the environment and the rights of communities in various countries. At the forefront of protecting the environment, the climate, and peopleIn the context of the climate, environmental, and social crises, Latin America has been the birthplace of important legal tools to protect territories, ecosystems, communities, and the global climate.These recent developments have included the Escazú Agreement and Advisory Opinion 32 (OC-32/25) on the climate emergency issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which reinforce and reaffirm binding standards for climate action, environmental protection, and the defense of human rights.The Escazú Agreement, which entered into force on April 22, 2021, is the first regional environmental treaty—and the first of its kind in the world—to include specific provisions for the protection of individuals, groups, and organizations that promote and defend human rights in environmental matters in Latin America and the Caribbean.It is an international milestone in the areas of participation, information, and the protection of environmental defenders, as well as a model for other continents.As for the Inter-American Court’s ruling, made public on July 3, 2025, it recognizes the right to a healthy climate as an autonomous right—enforceable in its own right—with clear obligations for States in the face of the climate emergency. The court even reaffirms the State’s obligation to keep the planet’s average temperature at 1.5 °C, recognizing that this threshold is already having an impact on human rights.The court also establishes rules for enhanced due diligence, which entail, among other things, the duty of States to conduct environmental impact assessments, to establish clear guidelines for activities that may harm health or ecosystems, and to regulate public and private activities that affect the climate more rigorously and strictly.Furthermore, the ruling recognizes the right to science and the importance of the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and traditional communities as a fundamental component of climate action from a human rights perspective, applicable to all countries. Setbacks for protecting the environment and human rightsRecent examples in various countries across the continent show dangerous setbacks in the frameworks for the protection of the environment and community rights, as well as in the institutions responsible for this task.These setbacks jeopardize the rights of indigenous peoples and traditional communities and highlight extractivist pressures that threaten to exacerbate environmental degradation.These dynamics are reflected in the merger of environmental ministries with entities tasked with production or extraction, as well as in the relaxation of environmental assessment processes, which limit the tools available to communities and defenders to protect ecosystems and ways of life. Here are some examples: Chile (2025–2026). Two developments threaten the integrity of the country’s environmental governance: the reform of the regulations governing the Environmental Impact Assessment Service and the legislative process for the Framework Law on the Authorization of Sectoral Permits. Both seek to expedite environmental permits based on sworn statements, without prior oversight or the submission of environmental impact studies or statements. They also incorporate the concept of “administrative silence,” which means that if the administrative authority does not rule on a project’s admissibility, the application is officially accepted for processing.In addition, the government is pushing forward with a major reform to boost investment in Chile. Among other things, the so-called “Miscellaneous Law” makes the Environmental Impact Assessment System more flexible and allows companies to be compensated if environmental courts revoke an environmental permit.Argentina (2022–2026). Mining expansion took hold in the province of Jujuy following a constitutional amendment that did not include consultation with Indigenous peoples or mechanisms for citizen participation, particularly in connection with lithium mining in areas historically inhabited by Indigenous and peasant communities.At the national level, the Ministry of the Environment was abolished in 2023, and its responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. In 2024, the Incentive Regime for Large Investments was created, which grants tax and customs benefits for up to 30 years to megaprojects without requiring environmental impact studies, thereby creating an imbalance between investment rights and environmental rights. In addition, the “glacier law” was amended, marking another setback for environmental protection. Bolivia (2026). The Simplified Mining Compliance Regulations were approved, modifying environmental requirements and exempting project proponents from prior consultation and environmental impact assessments. This enables and expands gold mining in protected natural areas and indigenous territories, violates the rights of indigenous peoples, and disregards the rulings of the Agro-Environmental Court.And in August 2026, President Rodrigo Paz abolished the Ministry of Development Planning and the Environment. As a result of that reform, the Vice Ministry of the Environment was placed under the Ministry of Productive, Rural, and Water Development, an agency headed by an agribusiness executive.Ecuador (2025). Under the banner of “administrative efficiency,” the Ministry of the Environment, Water, and Ecological Transition was merged with the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This led to the creation of the Ministry of Environment and Energy. Experts indicate that this decision could undermine the independence of the environmental authority and, as a result, weaken due diligence principles, facilitate the approval of extractive projects, and reduce environmental oversight powers. Brazil (2025). The new General Environmental Licensing Law (Law 15,190/2025) aims to streamline the granting of environmental permits. The law extends the "License by Adherence and Commitment"—a self-declaration system that does not require a prior impact assessment—to small- and medium-scale activities with low or medium pollution potential. Regarding indigenous participation, the law restricts the mandatory opinion of the National Foundation for Indigenous Peoples to officially recognized lands, thereby excluding from this oversight at least 297 territories currently undergoing regularization. Furthermore, in cases where such an opinion is required, it lacks binding effect, thereby weakening the role of the licensing authority as a guarantor. Subsequently, the regulation was amended by Law No. 15,300/2025 to create the Special Environmental License, intended for projects classified as “strategic” by the Governing Council, with a maximum completion period of one year. Both regulations are being challenged before the Federal Supreme Court through four legal actions. The court plans to review these cases on August 12, 2026, to issue a ruling on the validity of the two laws. The legal frameworks and institutions that make up environmental governance cannot be viewed as mere technicalities or bureaucratic procedures, but rather as tools for protecting the right to a healthy environment. This right is essential to ensuring the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, such as the right to life, food, and water, among others.  The weakening of environmental institutions or procedures does not merely “shorten timelines.” It undermines and restricts rights, reduces oversight, and broadens the scope for decisions that may affect territories and ecosystems without sufficient information, meaningful participation, or effective access to justice.The procedures that guarantee the human right to a healthy environment are not obstacles. They are essential to ensuring life. Recognizing the challenges without losing hopeInternational law is grounded in human dignity and the inherent integrity of nature. It is not a matter of declarations or decisions made by any body, but rather the recognition of an order that exists above all else, that precedes and belongs to all people without distinction. It is also a mechanism for preventing conflicts.What is at stake today carries far greater weight than the short-term deregulation efforts of successive governments. The hard-won rights that are now being eroded are the result of years of collective organizing, through which legal, social, and cultural safeguards have been established to protect future generations as well.In this context, strategic litigation and social mobilization are key tools for promoting environmental democracy, preventing setbacks, and establishing precedents that ensure the effective enforcement of already recognized rights. Similarly, the role of Indigenous peoples, traditional communities, and ancestral culture is central not only in terms of the recognition of rights but also in safeguarding territories, ancestral knowledge, and ways of life based on a respectful relationship with nature.None of this can be sustained without the active support of society as a whole. Defending what has already been achieved requires collective awareness, organization, and commitment so that the progress made in the region is not eroded but rather strengthened. This depends on our continued demand for transparency, participation, justice, and respect for standards that reflect the intrinsic natural order of people and the environment. 

Read more

Parque Nacional Manuel Antonio en Costa Rica

Climate-focused environmental assessment: Key to protecting human rights

In a landmark ruling for climate justice in Latin America, on June 16, Costa Rica’s Constitutional Court ordered the government to include a climate impact analysis in the assessment of any project, construction, or activity that could affect the environment.The decision builds on similar achievements in other countries on the continent, resulting from strategic climate litigation.The ruling in Costa Rica was the result of litigation supported by AIDA, in which we filed a legal brief presenting solid arguments demonstrating that incorporating a climate perspective into project assessments is an obligation under national legislation, international agreements, and the experience of other countries in the region.Since the climate crisis is the most urgent environmental and human rights threat the world currently faces, it is important for courts to uphold the requirement that governments assess climate-related risks and impacts before authorizing any project or activity.The procedure established to conduct this analysis—known as an environmental impact assessment (EIA)—is specifically designed to identify, anticipate, analyze, mitigate, and/or prevent the environmental impacts of potentially harmful projects or activities.At the same time, it is a key tool for preventing development proposals from violating the rights of individuals and communities, including the universal right to a healthy environment.Below, we detail the reasons why governments must assess a project’s climate impacts before giving it the green light—these were our contributions to the recent legal victory in Costa Rica. National and international obligationsSeveral national regulations establish the obligation to include climate change criteria in project environmental assessments. In Costa Rica, for example, we have: Decree 42465 of 2019, which requires institutions carrying out public infrastructure projects to assess climate risks, climate change, and other natural or human-induced factors at all stages of the project. Our brief also refers to a series of documents that analyze climate risk in Costa Rica, a country that, due to its location in the Central American tropics, is exposed to extreme weather events—hurricanes, tropical storms, droughts, and floods—whose frequency and intensity have increased as a result of global warming.At the international level, Costa Rica, like other countries on the continent, is a party to treaties and other instruments of international law that entail obligations regarding the environment and human rights, which make reference to the environmental assessment of projects: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It requires governments to use appropriate methods, such as project impact assessments, to minimize the adverse effects of climate change on the economy, public health, and the environment.Paris Agreement. It requires governments to take and report on the actions they will undertake to reduce climate-damaging gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, all of which must respect human rights.Convention on Biological Diversity. It requires countries to implement appropriate procedures to ensure that projects likely to have a significant adverse impact on biological diversity are assessed, with a view to preventing or minimizing such impacts, and to allow for public participation where appropriate.Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. It calls on countries to develop, strengthen, and implement relevant actions to align sustainable development and growth, food security, health and safety, climate variability and change, environmental management, and disaster risk reduction.Advisory Opinion No. 23 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It requires that environmental assessments of projects take into account their cumulative impacts, prevent harm to indigenous communities and tribal peoples, include contingency and mitigation plans, and ensure that the assessments are objective, independent, and subject to state oversight. Lessons from other Latin American countriesIn several countries on the continent, the requirement to incorporate climate criteria into environmental assessments has been institutionally established and also upheld by court rulings. Two recent cases illustrate this:Chile. In a 2022 litigation related to the Mejillones thermal power plant, located in the Antofagasta Region, the Supreme Court ordered Chile’s Environmental Assessment Service to analyze the atmospheric component—including those elements that have changed in the terrestrial environment due to climate change—from the start of the project’s implementation to the present.Colombia. In response to a lawsuit challenging the country’s environmental permitting regulations, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2024 that environmental impact studies must include an assessment of climate change impacts: “a global phenomenon determined by multiple biophysical and socioeconomic variables that interact over long periods of time, which is having an increasingly decisive effect on natural processes and impacts territories, communities, and individuals in different ways, with Colombia being one of the most affected countries.” Protecting a healthy environment in the face of the climate crisisAs noted above, incorporating climate change criteria into the environmental assessment of projects is essential for the enjoyment of the right to a healthy environment. This implies:Assessing the impacts that the project or activity may have on climate change. This includes quantifying and documenting direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions; determining whether, and to what extent, these emissions increase or decrease; and analyzing appropriate mitigation strategies to address anticipated impacts.Considering the effects of the climate crisis (such as climate-induced accidents or disasters) on the development, viability, and sustainability of the project or activity over time, this analysis should inform the decision on its authorization. The climate crisis is not a threat, but a reality that is already severely affecting the region. In this context, it is imperative that development projects continue to undergo proper environmental assessments that require mandatory, systematic consideration of climate impacts for both mitigation and adaptation. Through strategic litigation, AIDA will continue to contribute to this effort. Learn more in our fact sheet, "Climate Change Perspectives in Environmental Impact Studies" (in Spanish). Check out our report, "Global Best Practices for Environmental Impact Studies" (in Spanish). 

Read more

A man sitting in a boat sailing down the Amazon River.

Climate justice unlocked

How the Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion 32/25 Rewrites the Rules for Climate Litigation in Latin America. This article was originally published on Verfassungsblog. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has just handed climate litigators in Latin America the most powerful tool they have ever had. Advisory Opinion OC-32/25, issued in 2025, does not merely interpret existing rights in the context of the climate crisis. It restructures the procedural architecture of climate litigation by inverting burdens of proof, authorising the presumption of causal links between state emissions and climate harm, and recognising satellite imagery as evidence that states must make accessible to victims. For organisations that have spent years fighting for communities on the front lines of the climate emergency, this is not an incremental development. It is a transformative moment.The Opinion did not emerge from a vacuum. Over the past decade, the Inter-American Court has built the foundations step by step. In 2017, Advisory Opinion OC-23 established the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous right under the American Convention – not a derivative entitlement, but a freestanding legal guarantee with its own independent status. That standard moved from theory to practice in the contentious case of La Oroya v. Peru, where the Court found that severe environmental contamination created a systemic risk to life, health, and physical integrity. OC-32/25 is the third step in this trajectory – and by far the most ambitious.The Opinion characterises the climate crisis as a human rights problem that falls disproportionately on those already marginalised. It maps the vulnerabilities of Latin America and the Caribbean with precision, identifying Central America, the Amazon, the Caribbean and the Andes as zones of existential risk. The figures the Court cites are sobering. In 2021, the region counted 17.1 million internally displaced persons due to climate-related causes. The top one per cent of the population generated 92 per cent of per-capita CO₂ emissions in 2019, while the bottom 50 per cent generated just 0.27 per cent. Those who emit the least suffer the most.  Across these ecosystems, indigenous peoples and traditional communities are disproportionately affected by ongoing violations of their rights linked to climate change. A New Autonomous RightFrom the right to a healthy environment, the Court derives a new autonomous right: the right to a healthy climate, defined as the right to live in a climate system free from dangerous anthropogenic interference. The Opinion treats this right as an indispensable precondition for the exercise of all other human rights in the context of the climate emergency. States are accordingly bound by a standard of heightened due diligence. Climate governance is no longer treated as a matter of political discretion alone. States must prevent climate harm inside and beyond their borders, require environmental impact assessments to include specific analyses of greenhouse gas emissions before authorising projects, and set ambitious, progressive reduction targets calibrated to the best available science. The scientific consensus reflected in IPCC assessments is explicitly treated as the legal reference standard.The Court adds a prohibition on regression: protection levels already achieved are a floor, not a ceiling. It extends due diligence obligations not only to states’ own activities but also to companies operating under their jurisdiction. These propositions are not entirely new, but the Opinion consolidates them into a unified framework and gives them the authority of a definitive Inter-American interpretation. For litigation purposes, the catalogue of obligations is now largely settled. Procedural Rights as the Real InnovationIf the substantive obligations are important, the procedural innovations are transformative. The most significant contribution of OC-32/25 for climate litigation is not the declaration of a right to a healthy climate – it is the way the Opinion restructures the access rights framework. Indeed, the Court developed two very valuable elements: the right to science, and standards of proof and evidence that strengthen climate litigation. "The right to science includes access to the benefits of scientific and technological progress and to the co-production of knowledge between scientists and holders of local, traditional and indigenous knowledge." (par. 473) The right to science, grounded in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and read together with OC-32/25, creates enforceable obligations for states to guarantee effective access to scientific climate knowledge. States can no longer rely on claims of scientific uncertainty or insufficient knowledge: policies must be based on the best available science and updated as that science evolves. Environmental impact assessments (par. 362), national adaptation plans (par. 388), and Nationally Determined Contributions are treated as auditable documents that must rely on scientifically credible evidence and remain transparent (parr. 510, 511 and 486). Most significantly, judges can and must evaluate whether the scientific basis relied upon by the state satisfies Convention standards (parr. 488–539). This substantially expands the scope of judicial review of climate policy within the Inter-American system. Reversing the Burden of ProofProving a direct causal link between a specific state’s emissions and a specific harm has historically been the single greatest obstacle in climate litigation – technically demanding, judicially contested, and practically out of reach for most affected communities. OC-32/25 dismantles that obstacle in four concrete moves.The Opinion acknowledges that climate litigation is characterised by marked asymmetries between parties in their access to technical and scientific information. National courts must therefore adopt measures – including the reversal of the burden of proof – to guarantee effective judicial protection. The language is direct: "the burden of justifying any denial always falls on the State" (par. 490). In matters of information access passivity is not an option for the state.Second, the Opinion accepts a presumption of the causal nexus between a state’s greenhouse gas emissions and the degradation of the global climate system, and in turn the link between that degradation and the risks facing people and ecosystems – provided this is anchored in IPCC assessments. This responds directly to the attribution problem that has shaped the limits of climate litigation for decades. Courts are no longer required to resolve the full scientific chain of causation in each individual case.Third, the Opinion introduces alternative standards of proof. Access to climate justice does not require proving individualised causation for each harm. It is sufficient to demonstrate the generation or tolerance of significant risks through state inaction, and the effective exposure of people or groups to those risks. Communities do not need to show that a specific tonne of CO₂ from a specific state caused their specific flood. They need to show that they were exposed to foreseeable risks that the state failed to address.Fourth, the Court highlights satellite evidence as particularly relevant in climate cases and requires states to ensure cooperation and technology transfer to make such evidence accessible to victims in judicial proceedings. This is a practical recognition that the evidentiary tools needed for climate litigation are often technically sophisticated and economically inaccessible to the communities that need them most. What Changes for LitigationTaken together, these four innovations transform the strategic landscape for climate litigation across the Americas. Organisations like AIDA can now challenge fossil fuel projects whose environmental impact assessments fail to incorporate adequate climate analysis – invoking the right to science directly. We can contest state climate policies on the grounds of scientific insufficiency or obsolescence. We can bring cases on behalf of entire communities without proving individual, direct harm, thanks to the broad standing the Opinion recognises. And we can defend indigenous territories by connecting climate damage to collective territorial rights through a framework that no longer demands the near-impossible standard of individualised causation.OC-32/25 is not a self-executing judgment. Its standards will need to be invoked, argued, and developed case by case before the Inter-American Court, the Commission, and national courts across member states. Resistance from states that seek to preserve the status quo is predictable. But the architecture is now in place: the applicable rules have changed.At AIDA, we have spent years litigating in a region where the gap between states’ formal climate commitments and the actual protection experienced by communities is vast. OC-32/25 gives us legal instruments to narrow that gap. It does not ask us to be more optimistic. It asks us to be more ambitious – in the cases we choose, in the standards we invoke, and in the connections we draw between international law and the communities on the front lines of the climate crisis. 

Read more