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5 keys to collective action: Lessons from the meeting of environmental defenders from the Southern Cone
Can an energy transition be just if it repeats the harms of traditional extractivism?That was one of the central questions of “Articulando Territorios: Meeting of Defenders from the Southern Cone”, an event held on June 9 and 10 in Santiago, Chile, that brought together environmental defenders from Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.For years, AIDA has stood alongside those defending their territories against extractive and energy projects in Latin America. This meeting was part of that commitment: a space to share experiences, strengthen protection capacities, and collectively reflect on the impacts of the pressures of the global energy transition, including the rise of extractivism.Here are the five key lessons we took away: 1. Communities are at the heart of the resistance for a just and sustainable energy transitionMany of the activities promoted under the global paradigm of the energy transition—such as lithium, copper, and other “strategic” metal mining, as well as port megaprojects—aimed at decarbonizing the energy mix continue to reproduce the historical dynamics of intensive resource extraction. The experiences and lessons shared in regions such as San Antonio in Chile, Salinas Grandes and Vaca Muerta in Argentina, and the salt flats of Bolivia point the way toward environmental justice. Against this new backdrop—and amid a wave of extractive expansion—local communities are shifting from being areas affected by these projects to becoming strategic allies in the resistance movements of the Southern Cone. 2. Defending the territory is a project that encompasses all aspects of life and shapes one's identityBeing an environmental defender is not a temporary job or activity, but a true life’s work. From this perspective, territorial defense goes beyond the protection of a physical or economic space. It involves cultural identity, collective memory, spirituality, and the intrinsic “body-territory” relationship. This framework explains why the impacts on ecosystems cannot be measured solely in economic terms: they directly damage the social fabric through community fragmentation, the forced migration of young people, and the painful loss of ancestral practices. 3. Protection must be comprehensive, collective, and proactiveThe protection of those who defend the territory cannot depend on individual reactions or improvised measures when the risk is imminent. Protecting ourselves means identifying threats and strengths, and increasing our capacity to respond to risks. Building support networks, ensuring protection protocols are in place, and prioritizing collective care are the foundation for establishing robust processes for territorial and environmental defense. 4. Communication is about challenging narratives without revictimizingCommunication is a fundamental tool for political protection and strategic advocacy to counteract power imbalances. Communities must position themselves as primary sources of territorial knowledge and as the authors of their own narratives. Effective communication means bringing their knowledge, their proposals, and their capacity for organized resistance to the forefront, without reducing them to suffering or revictimizing them. 5. Recognize the right to defend the environment and use international tools as a means of protectionRecognizing that defending the environment is a holistic life project means recognizing and legitimizing the right to defend it. Territory and environmental defenders safeguard common goods that benefit society as a whole. It is necessary to explicitly recognize the legitimacy and dignity of this work by eliminating stigmas and criminalization, and by ensuring safe spaces for the exercise of this right.In this context, the tools of international law are part of the range of protective measures, including:Strategic litigation. The success and transformative value of strategic environmental litigation go far beyond simply obtaining a favorable court ruling. Its true potential lies in bringing silenced conflicts to light, generating independent technical evidence, and opening up political spaces—all of which occur when it is well coordinated with community-based organizational processes.Escazú Agreement. The Escazú Agreement is a fundamental regional framework thanks to the three procedural rights—access to information, participation, and justice in environmental matters—that it guarantees and upon which it is built. It is key to the active protection of environmental human rights defenders. This framework must be transformed into a tool for defense in the hands of communities, particularly through well-founded legal action and the activation of the mechanisms provided for in the agreement. The recent gathering of environmental defenders from the Southern Cone confirms something that AIDA has observed across the entire continent: the defense of the environment and human rights is built through networking.We will continue to stand with communities and environmental defenders in Latin America to ensure that the energy transition does not come at the expense of their territories and their lives.
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Environmental law in Latin America: Progress and setbacks
Environmental law in Latin America is currently facing a paradox.The continent has recently seen historic progress in developing binding legal standards to protect the environment and those who defend it. However, this progress coexists with the weakening of legal and institutional frameworks for protecting the environment and the rights of communities in various countries. At the forefront of protecting the environment, the climate, and peopleIn the context of the climate, environmental, and social crises, Latin America has been the birthplace of important legal tools to protect territories, ecosystems, communities, and the global climate.These recent developments have included the Escazú Agreement and Advisory Opinion 32 (OC-32/25) on the climate emergency issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which reinforce and reaffirm binding standards for climate action, environmental protection, and the defense of human rights.The Escazú Agreement, which entered into force on April 22, 2021, is the first regional environmental treaty—and the first of its kind in the world—to include specific provisions for the protection of individuals, groups, and organizations that promote and defend human rights in environmental matters in Latin America and the Caribbean.It is an international milestone in the areas of participation, information, and the protection of environmental defenders, as well as a model for other continents.As for the Inter-American Court’s ruling, made public on July 3, 2025, it recognizes the right to a healthy climate as an autonomous right—enforceable in its own right—with clear obligations for States in the face of the climate emergency. The court even reaffirms the State’s obligation to keep the planet’s average temperature at 1.5 °C, recognizing that this threshold is already having an impact on human rights.The court also establishes rules for enhanced due diligence, which entail, among other things, the duty of States to conduct environmental impact assessments, to establish clear guidelines for activities that may harm health or ecosystems, and to regulate public and private activities that affect the climate more rigorously and strictly.Furthermore, the ruling recognizes the right to science and the importance of the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and traditional communities as a fundamental component of climate action from a human rights perspective, applicable to all countries. Setbacks for protecting the environment and human rightsRecent examples in various countries across the continent show dangerous setbacks in the frameworks for the protection of the environment and community rights, as well as in the institutions responsible for this task.These setbacks jeopardize the rights of indigenous peoples and traditional communities and highlight extractivist pressures that threaten to exacerbate environmental degradation.These dynamics are reflected in the merger of environmental ministries with entities tasked with production or extraction, as well as in the relaxation of environmental assessment processes, which limit the tools available to communities and defenders to protect ecosystems and ways of life. Here are some examples: Chile (2025–2026). Two developments threaten the integrity of the country’s environmental governance: the reform of the regulations governing the Environmental Impact Assessment Service and the legislative process for the Framework Law on the Authorization of Sectoral Permits. Both seek to expedite environmental permits based on sworn statements, without prior oversight or the submission of environmental impact studies or statements. They also incorporate the concept of “administrative silence,” which means that if the administrative authority does not rule on a project’s admissibility, the application is officially accepted for processing.In addition, the government is pushing forward with a major reform to boost investment in Chile. Among other things, the so-called “Miscellaneous Law” makes the Environmental Impact Assessment System more flexible and allows companies to be compensated if environmental courts revoke an environmental permit.Argentina (2022–2026). Mining expansion took hold in the province of Jujuy following a constitutional amendment that did not include consultation with Indigenous peoples or mechanisms for citizen participation, particularly in connection with lithium mining in areas historically inhabited by Indigenous and peasant communities.At the national level, the Ministry of the Environment was abolished in 2023, and its responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. In 2024, the Incentive Regime for Large Investments was created, which grants tax and customs benefits for up to 30 years to megaprojects without requiring environmental impact studies, thereby creating an imbalance between investment rights and environmental rights. In addition, the “glacier law” was amended, marking another setback for environmental protection. Bolivia (2026). The Simplified Mining Compliance Regulations were approved, modifying environmental requirements and exempting project proponents from prior consultation and environmental impact assessments. This enables and expands gold mining in protected natural areas and indigenous territories, violates the rights of indigenous peoples, and disregards the rulings of the Agro-Environmental Court.And in August 2026, President Rodrigo Paz abolished the Ministry of Development Planning and the Environment. As a result of that reform, the Vice Ministry of the Environment was placed under the Ministry of Productive, Rural, and Water Development, an agency headed by an agribusiness executive.Ecuador (2025). Under the banner of “administrative efficiency,” the Ministry of the Environment, Water, and Ecological Transition was merged with the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This led to the creation of the Ministry of Environment and Energy. Experts indicate that this decision could undermine the independence of the environmental authority and, as a result, weaken due diligence principles, facilitate the approval of extractive projects, and reduce environmental oversight powers. Brazil (2025). The new General Environmental Licensing Law (Law 15,190/2025) aims to streamline the granting of environmental permits. The law extends the "License by Adherence and Commitment"—a self-declaration system that does not require a prior impact assessment—to small- and medium-scale activities with low or medium pollution potential. Regarding indigenous participation, the law restricts the mandatory opinion of the National Foundation for Indigenous Peoples to officially recognized lands, thereby excluding from this oversight at least 297 territories currently undergoing regularization. Furthermore, in cases where such an opinion is required, it lacks binding effect, thereby weakening the role of the licensing authority as a guarantor. Subsequently, the regulation was amended by Law No. 15,300/2025 to create the Special Environmental License, intended for projects classified as “strategic” by the Governing Council, with a maximum completion period of one year. Both regulations are being challenged before the Federal Supreme Court through four legal actions. The court plans to review these cases on August 12, 2026, to issue a ruling on the validity of the two laws. The legal frameworks and institutions that make up environmental governance cannot be viewed as mere technicalities or bureaucratic procedures, but rather as tools for protecting the right to a healthy environment. This right is essential to ensuring the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, such as the right to life, food, and water, among others. The weakening of environmental institutions or procedures does not merely “shorten timelines.” It undermines and restricts rights, reduces oversight, and broadens the scope for decisions that may affect territories and ecosystems without sufficient information, meaningful participation, or effective access to justice.The procedures that guarantee the human right to a healthy environment are not obstacles. They are essential to ensuring life. Recognizing the challenges without losing hopeInternational law is grounded in human dignity and the inherent integrity of nature. It is not a matter of declarations or decisions made by any body, but rather the recognition of an order that exists above all else, that precedes and belongs to all people without distinction. It is also a mechanism for preventing conflicts.What is at stake today carries far greater weight than the short-term deregulation efforts of successive governments. The hard-won rights that are now being eroded are the result of years of collective organizing, through which legal, social, and cultural safeguards have been established to protect future generations as well.In this context, strategic litigation and social mobilization are key tools for promoting environmental democracy, preventing setbacks, and establishing precedents that ensure the effective enforcement of already recognized rights. Similarly, the role of Indigenous peoples, traditional communities, and ancestral culture is central not only in terms of the recognition of rights but also in safeguarding territories, ancestral knowledge, and ways of life based on a respectful relationship with nature.None of this can be sustained without the active support of society as a whole. Defending what has already been achieved requires collective awareness, organization, and commitment so that the progress made in the region is not eroded but rather strengthened. This depends on our continued demand for transparency, participation, justice, and respect for standards that reflect the intrinsic natural order of people and the environment.
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Fracking: A step toward the energy transition or a continued reliance on fossil fuels?
One argument made by supporters of fracking as a step toward the energy transition is that the technique buys time while alternatives to fossil fuels reach maturity and stability.Behind this line of reasoning lies the possibility of extracting more gas and the myth that it is a natural resource—when in fact it is a fossil fuel—and that it allows for the safe generation of energy without causing as much pollution as oil and coal.But a technique that perpetuates the use of fossil fuels—and whose environmental and social harms are widespread and well-documented—cannot be viewed as a solution or a step toward a transition that not only seeks to move beyond fossil fuels but also involves a paradigm shift in the energy system.Furthermore, by increasing dependence on oil and gas, fracking contributes to the worsening of the climate crisis due to methane emissions associated with the gas industry, as methane has a greater global warming potential than carbon dioxide (CO₂).Below, we debunk arguments that promote this technique as a step toward the energy transition. The continuation of an extractivist systemHydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a technique for extracting gas from underground that involves drilling deep into the ground to inject, at very high pressure, a mixture of water, sand, and chemical additives (some of which are toxic) to fracture underground rock formations and extract the hydrocarbons "trapped" within them.Like the oil and coal industries, fracking uses a non-renewable energy source, intensively exploits natural resources such as water, and causes large-scale disruptions in the areas where it is carried out.Not only does it replicate these patterns of the fossil fuel industry, but its negative impacts are similar—and even more severe—than those of other fossil fuel exploration, extraction, and production activities. These include: water and air pollution, overexploitation of natural resources, land encroachment, ecosystem disruption, and the devastation of flora and fauna.This repetition of patterns seen in the fossil fuel industry means that fracking not only perpetuates dependence on fossil fuels, but also contributes to its expansion and consolidation.In fact, the development of infrastructure for its operation helps create and consolidate markets for long-term gas consumption, since it requires large-scale investments spanning several decades. This can create economic incentives to maintain and maximize its use over time, and discourage or delay decarbonization efforts. "Natural" gas? Less CO₂, but more methaneThe gas obtained through fracking has been called “natural”—a label meant to make it seem clean. But gas from fracking is neither natural nor clean.It’s dirty from start to finish—from the toxic chemicals injected into the ground to extract it to the greenhouse gases emitted during its production and combustion. Not to mention that it’s a fossil fuel, just like oil or coal.Another argument used to suggest that fracking gas is cleaner—and thus to promote it as a "transition fuel"—is that it produces fewer CO₂ emissions than other fossil fuels. This is a half-truth, as it fails to mention that the main component of natural gas is methane, a greenhouse gas whose global warming potential is much greater than that of CO₂.According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), methane’s global warming potential is approximately 82.5 times greater than that of CO₂ over a 20-year time horizon. This means that, despite emitting less CO₂ during combustion, fracking gas can have a climate impact equal to or even greater than that of other fossil fuels when methane emissions are taken into account.These emissions can occur both during planned events and as a result of leaks throughout the entire production and supply chain.Some studies estimate that methane leaks from unconventional gas operations—such as fracking—can reach up to 12% throughout the production and transportation chain, or that global leaks account for up to 5% of total gas production. Incompatibility with climate and human rights obligationsAs we have seen, fracking means greater dependence on fossil fuels and higher levels of polluting emissions. This not only undermines the argument that it is a "transition fuel," but also shows how this technique runs counter to countries’ international commitments regarding the climate crisis.The Paris Agreement, the most important binding global commitment to address the climate crisis, stipulates that countries must substantially reduce their greenhouse gas emissions—including CO₂ and methane—to limit the rise in global temperatures.How could a country justify that using a technique that involves generating more polluting emissions is consistent with its commitments to reduce them?Implementing fracking is also incompatible with States’ obligation to protect the human right to a healthy environment, especially in light of the impacts of the climate crisis. This principle was established in Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which reinforced States' obligation to adopt measures to protect the climate system and the human rights of both present and future generations.At this time, when various countries in the region are considering launching or expanding fracking activities, it is essential that discussions not be limited to technical analyses, but rather address the environmental, climate, and human rights dimensions of these activities in light of the countries’ international commitments.So that narratives attempting to portray fracking as a step toward the transition do not obscure the fact that, in reality, it is an anchor that keeps us tied to our dependence on fossil fuels. Learn more about the impacts of fracking and the actions being taken to curb its expansion.
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Climate-focused environmental assessment: Key to protecting human rights
In a landmark ruling for climate justice in Latin America, on June 16, Costa Rica’s Constitutional Court ordered the government to include a climate impact analysis in the assessment of any project, construction, or activity that could affect the environment.The decision builds on similar achievements in other countries on the continent, resulting from strategic climate litigation.The ruling in Costa Rica was the result of litigation supported by AIDA, in which we filed a legal brief presenting solid arguments demonstrating that incorporating a climate perspective into project assessments is an obligation under national legislation, international agreements, and the experience of other countries in the region.Since the climate crisis is the most urgent environmental and human rights threat the world currently faces, it is important for courts to uphold the requirement that governments assess climate-related risks and impacts before authorizing any project or activity.The procedure established to conduct this analysis—known as an environmental impact assessment (EIA)—is specifically designed to identify, anticipate, analyze, mitigate, and/or prevent the environmental impacts of potentially harmful projects or activities.At the same time, it is a key tool for preventing development proposals from violating the rights of individuals and communities, including the universal right to a healthy environment.Below, we detail the reasons why governments must assess a project’s climate impacts before giving it the green light—these were our contributions to the recent legal victory in Costa Rica. National and international obligationsSeveral national regulations establish the obligation to include climate change criteria in project environmental assessments. In Costa Rica, for example, we have: Decree 42465 of 2019, which requires institutions carrying out public infrastructure projects to assess climate risks, climate change, and other natural or human-induced factors at all stages of the project. Our brief also refers to a series of documents that analyze climate risk in Costa Rica, a country that, due to its location in the Central American tropics, is exposed to extreme weather events—hurricanes, tropical storms, droughts, and floods—whose frequency and intensity have increased as a result of global warming.At the international level, Costa Rica, like other countries on the continent, is a party to treaties and other instruments of international law that entail obligations regarding the environment and human rights, which make reference to the environmental assessment of projects: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. It requires governments to use appropriate methods, such as project impact assessments, to minimize the adverse effects of climate change on the economy, public health, and the environment.Paris Agreement. It requires governments to take and report on the actions they will undertake to reduce climate-damaging gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, all of which must respect human rights.Convention on Biological Diversity. It requires countries to implement appropriate procedures to ensure that projects likely to have a significant adverse impact on biological diversity are assessed, with a view to preventing or minimizing such impacts, and to allow for public participation where appropriate.Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. It calls on countries to develop, strengthen, and implement relevant actions to align sustainable development and growth, food security, health and safety, climate variability and change, environmental management, and disaster risk reduction.Advisory Opinion No. 23 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It requires that environmental assessments of projects take into account their cumulative impacts, prevent harm to indigenous communities and tribal peoples, include contingency and mitigation plans, and ensure that the assessments are objective, independent, and subject to state oversight. Lessons from other Latin American countriesIn several countries on the continent, the requirement to incorporate climate criteria into environmental assessments has been institutionally established and also upheld by court rulings. Two recent cases illustrate this:Chile. In a 2022 litigation related to the Mejillones thermal power plant, located in the Antofagasta Region, the Supreme Court ordered Chile’s Environmental Assessment Service to analyze the atmospheric component—including those elements that have changed in the terrestrial environment due to climate change—from the start of the project’s implementation to the present.Colombia. In response to a lawsuit challenging the country’s environmental permitting regulations, the Constitutional Court ruled in 2024 that environmental impact studies must include an assessment of climate change impacts: “a global phenomenon determined by multiple biophysical and socioeconomic variables that interact over long periods of time, which is having an increasingly decisive effect on natural processes and impacts territories, communities, and individuals in different ways, with Colombia being one of the most affected countries.” Protecting a healthy environment in the face of the climate crisisAs noted above, incorporating climate change criteria into the environmental assessment of projects is essential for the enjoyment of the right to a healthy environment. This implies:Assessing the impacts that the project or activity may have on climate change. This includes quantifying and documenting direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions; determining whether, and to what extent, these emissions increase or decrease; and analyzing appropriate mitigation strategies to address anticipated impacts.Considering the effects of the climate crisis (such as climate-induced accidents or disasters) on the development, viability, and sustainability of the project or activity over time, this analysis should inform the decision on its authorization. The climate crisis is not a threat, but a reality that is already severely affecting the region. In this context, it is imperative that development projects continue to undergo proper environmental assessments that require mandatory, systematic consideration of climate impacts for both mitigation and adaptation. Through strategic litigation, AIDA will continue to contribute to this effort. Learn more in our fact sheet, "Climate Change Perspectives in Environmental Impact Studies" (in Spanish). Check out our report, "Global Best Practices for Environmental Impact Studies" (in Spanish).
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Climate justice unlocked
How the Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion 32/25 Rewrites the Rules for Climate Litigation in Latin America. This article was originally published on Verfassungsblog. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has just handed climate litigators in Latin America the most powerful tool they have ever had. Advisory Opinion OC-32/25, issued in 2025, does not merely interpret existing rights in the context of the climate crisis. It restructures the procedural architecture of climate litigation by inverting burdens of proof, authorising the presumption of causal links between state emissions and climate harm, and recognising satellite imagery as evidence that states must make accessible to victims. For organisations that have spent years fighting for communities on the front lines of the climate emergency, this is not an incremental development. It is a transformative moment.The Opinion did not emerge from a vacuum. Over the past decade, the Inter-American Court has built the foundations step by step. In 2017, Advisory Opinion OC-23 established the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous right under the American Convention – not a derivative entitlement, but a freestanding legal guarantee with its own independent status. That standard moved from theory to practice in the contentious case of La Oroya v. Peru, where the Court found that severe environmental contamination created a systemic risk to life, health, and physical integrity. OC-32/25 is the third step in this trajectory – and by far the most ambitious.The Opinion characterises the climate crisis as a human rights problem that falls disproportionately on those already marginalised. It maps the vulnerabilities of Latin America and the Caribbean with precision, identifying Central America, the Amazon, the Caribbean and the Andes as zones of existential risk. The figures the Court cites are sobering. In 2021, the region counted 17.1 million internally displaced persons due to climate-related causes. The top one per cent of the population generated 92 per cent of per-capita CO₂ emissions in 2019, while the bottom 50 per cent generated just 0.27 per cent. Those who emit the least suffer the most. Across these ecosystems, indigenous peoples and traditional communities are disproportionately affected by ongoing violations of their rights linked to climate change. A New Autonomous RightFrom the right to a healthy environment, the Court derives a new autonomous right: the right to a healthy climate, defined as the right to live in a climate system free from dangerous anthropogenic interference. The Opinion treats this right as an indispensable precondition for the exercise of all other human rights in the context of the climate emergency. States are accordingly bound by a standard of heightened due diligence. Climate governance is no longer treated as a matter of political discretion alone. States must prevent climate harm inside and beyond their borders, require environmental impact assessments to include specific analyses of greenhouse gas emissions before authorising projects, and set ambitious, progressive reduction targets calibrated to the best available science. The scientific consensus reflected in IPCC assessments is explicitly treated as the legal reference standard.The Court adds a prohibition on regression: protection levels already achieved are a floor, not a ceiling. It extends due diligence obligations not only to states’ own activities but also to companies operating under their jurisdiction. These propositions are not entirely new, but the Opinion consolidates them into a unified framework and gives them the authority of a definitive Inter-American interpretation. For litigation purposes, the catalogue of obligations is now largely settled. Procedural Rights as the Real InnovationIf the substantive obligations are important, the procedural innovations are transformative. The most significant contribution of OC-32/25 for climate litigation is not the declaration of a right to a healthy climate – it is the way the Opinion restructures the access rights framework. Indeed, the Court developed two very valuable elements: the right to science, and standards of proof and evidence that strengthen climate litigation. "The right to science includes access to the benefits of scientific and technological progress and to the co-production of knowledge between scientists and holders of local, traditional and indigenous knowledge." (par. 473) The right to science, grounded in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and read together with OC-32/25, creates enforceable obligations for states to guarantee effective access to scientific climate knowledge. States can no longer rely on claims of scientific uncertainty or insufficient knowledge: policies must be based on the best available science and updated as that science evolves. Environmental impact assessments (par. 362), national adaptation plans (par. 388), and Nationally Determined Contributions are treated as auditable documents that must rely on scientifically credible evidence and remain transparent (parr. 510, 511 and 486). Most significantly, judges can and must evaluate whether the scientific basis relied upon by the state satisfies Convention standards (parr. 488–539). This substantially expands the scope of judicial review of climate policy within the Inter-American system. Reversing the Burden of ProofProving a direct causal link between a specific state’s emissions and a specific harm has historically been the single greatest obstacle in climate litigation – technically demanding, judicially contested, and practically out of reach for most affected communities. OC-32/25 dismantles that obstacle in four concrete moves.The Opinion acknowledges that climate litigation is characterised by marked asymmetries between parties in their access to technical and scientific information. National courts must therefore adopt measures – including the reversal of the burden of proof – to guarantee effective judicial protection. The language is direct: "the burden of justifying any denial always falls on the State" (par. 490). In matters of information access passivity is not an option for the state.Second, the Opinion accepts a presumption of the causal nexus between a state’s greenhouse gas emissions and the degradation of the global climate system, and in turn the link between that degradation and the risks facing people and ecosystems – provided this is anchored in IPCC assessments. This responds directly to the attribution problem that has shaped the limits of climate litigation for decades. Courts are no longer required to resolve the full scientific chain of causation in each individual case.Third, the Opinion introduces alternative standards of proof. Access to climate justice does not require proving individualised causation for each harm. It is sufficient to demonstrate the generation or tolerance of significant risks through state inaction, and the effective exposure of people or groups to those risks. Communities do not need to show that a specific tonne of CO₂ from a specific state caused their specific flood. They need to show that they were exposed to foreseeable risks that the state failed to address.Fourth, the Court highlights satellite evidence as particularly relevant in climate cases and requires states to ensure cooperation and technology transfer to make such evidence accessible to victims in judicial proceedings. This is a practical recognition that the evidentiary tools needed for climate litigation are often technically sophisticated and economically inaccessible to the communities that need them most. What Changes for LitigationTaken together, these four innovations transform the strategic landscape for climate litigation across the Americas. Organisations like AIDA can now challenge fossil fuel projects whose environmental impact assessments fail to incorporate adequate climate analysis – invoking the right to science directly. We can contest state climate policies on the grounds of scientific insufficiency or obsolescence. We can bring cases on behalf of entire communities without proving individual, direct harm, thanks to the broad standing the Opinion recognises. And we can defend indigenous territories by connecting climate damage to collective territorial rights through a framework that no longer demands the near-impossible standard of individualised causation.OC-32/25 is not a self-executing judgment. Its standards will need to be invoked, argued, and developed case by case before the Inter-American Court, the Commission, and national courts across member states. Resistance from states that seek to preserve the status quo is predictable. But the architecture is now in place: the applicable rules have changed.At AIDA, we have spent years litigating in a region where the gap between states’ formal climate commitments and the actual protection experienced by communities is vast. OC-32/25 gives us legal instruments to narrow that gap. It does not ask us to be more optimistic. It asks us to be more ambitious – in the cases we choose, in the standards we invoke, and in the connections we draw between international law and the communities on the front lines of the climate crisis.
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Pre-COP31 sessions in Bonn: A worn-out climate system with glimmers of hope
By Florencia Ortúzar Greene and Karla Maass* The world has been negotiating on climate change for 30 years. For 30 years, governments have been meeting annually, accompanied by increasingly alarming scientific reports. The multilateral process has matured; it now has implementation rules and mechanisms in place to drive global climate action, but that action remains limited and discretionary.What's going on? How can we breathe new life into this very important global process?The following are our reflections after participating in the 64th Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held June 8–18 in Bonn, Germany, to advance negotiations leading up to the 31st UN Climate Change Conference (COP31). The stalemate in international climate negotiationsIt would be unfair to say that the sessions in Bonn were a failure, let alone to be surprised by the lack of concrete results. What is happening is simply a reflection of a process in slow decline. This becomes evident at a time when there is sustained and widespread talk of the need for “implementation” and “cooperation” to put the Paris Agreement into effect, while, time and again, two irreconcilable rifts continue to block progress. Being able to identify them so clearly brings a certain sense of reassurance.The main point of contention remains financing. Developing countries consistently raise in negotiating rooms that the Paris Agreement not only sets targets for emissions reductions and adaptation but also establishes concrete commitments for financial support from developed countries. However, discussions on the provision of financing are completely stalled. This is happening in a context where commitments are not only insufficient but also inadequate in quality, accessibility, and predictability.In response to this demand, developed countries have placed increasing emphasis on mobilizing private capital and creating enabling conditions for investment. Although these flows can play an important role, private investment tends to be directed toward sectors and projects with clear financial returns. Meanwhile, critical areas such as adaptation, loss and damage, and capacity building continue to depend on concessional public financing. Added to this are structural debt-related issues that ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in countries already struggling to cope.The second point of contention relates to phasing out fossil fuels. For several States Parties, the willingness to embark on phasing out fossil fuels is not on the table. This is despite the fact that they are signatories to the Paris Agreement ad, at COP28 in Dubai, agreed to move toward a just, orderly, and equitable transition away from fossil fuels. There is talk of a just transition, but plans to expand fossil fuel use are as certain as they are concrete. The role of science in addressing the climate crisis has been sidelined One cause for concern at SB64 was the intention of representatives from various countries to downplay the role of science in climate decision-making. This is nothing new. It has been happening for years, gradually and steadily—perhaps so slowly that we hadn’t noticed it until now.This phenomenon became evident when contrasted with the results of the First International Conference on the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels, held recently in Santa Marta, Colombia. There, science served as the common thread and central foundation of the political dialogue. The way science was given a platform reminded us of how it was handled at the early COPs, which opened with presentations of the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Today, that no longer happens. These days, science appears as a second-rate guest, with a contested and unclear role.This is extremely important because, without science, the process loses its foundation and becomes a purely political negotiation, in which the side with the most power wins. Climate action: A new wind of hopeThis story doesn't end on a completely bleak note. At the climate talks in Bonn, some encouraging developments took place—the result of this long and complex process.The Brazilian COP30 Presidency took on the task of developing roadmaps to transition away from fossil fuels and to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030, thereby reinforcing the two central pillars of any effective and reliable climate action. This demonstrates leadership willing to break away from the official path to make progress.In addition, at COP30, it was agreed to implement a just transition mechanism (known as BAM), a decision that responded to the urgent call from civil society and affected communities. And in Bonn, countries made progress in implementing it. While there is still much to be done, the process is still on track and will be finalized at COP31, to be held November 9–20 in Antalya, Turkey.Furthermore, the Santa Marta Conference—organized within the framework of COP30 and bringing together 57 countries willing to discuss the energy transition—succeeded in launching a renewed process of dialogue, which is also an undisputed source of hope that will continue to grow stronger as we look ahead to the second conference, to be hosted by Tuvalu and Ireland. Learn more in our review of the SB64 (in Spanish). *Florencia Ortúzar Greene is the director of AIDA's Climate Program, and Karla Maass is an external consultant for the organization.
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The Xingu River is being silenced, but not its people
A river is always a path, sustenance, and memory. At the Volta Grande (or Great Bend) of the Xingu River, deep in the Brazilian Amazon, the water did more than just flow: it taught people when to plant, when to fish, and when to celebrate. There, life moved to the rhythm of the river. But that began to change in 2010, when plans were underway to build the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant, and a silent question began to grow: Who decides the fate of the water? Six years later, on May 5, 2016, when the dam was inaugurated, nearly 80% of the Xingu River’s flow had been diverted.As early as 2018, organizations and communities were warning that the flow management plan imposed on the Xingu River for the operation of the hydroelectric plant foreshadowed a future of drought.That warning has come true.Today, entire stretches of the river are dry. More than 100 kilometers of the Volta Grande have lost their natural flow. The water, which once sustained biodiversity and local ways of life, no longer flows as it once did. Without enough water, the fish have stopped reproducing. There has been no spawning for three years. The river’s silence has turned into hunger, uncertainty, and disruption. The death of the fish is not just an environmental impact: it is the breakdown of a way of life. Indigenous, riverine, and fishing communities have lost not only their primary source of food but also their autonomy and their connection to the land. Today, the legacy of Belo Monte is a growing accumulation of ecological, social, and cultural degradation. However, this story is not yet over. Time for justice for the Xingu River and the life it sustainsTen years after the Belo Monte Dam began operations, the reported impacts have been confirmed, but something unexpected has also grown stronger: resistance.The affected communities remain organized, active, and determined. They continue to speak out, demand reparations, and defend their right to live alongside the river.That strength is evident today in the protests against new projects in the area.Because for these communities, the struggle is not just against a project; it is for the survival of their way of life.Today is a moment of justice for them. The complaint against the Brazilian State for its international responsibility in the case has been before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights since 2011, pending a decision that could mark a turning point for the communities of the Xingu Basin. The complaint contains the legal and evidentiary elements necessary for the Commission to admit it, determine that there were several human rights violations, and refer the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, whose ruling could set a precedent for state regulation of megaprojects in the context of the climate crisis; public participation; and the protection of indigenous peoples, traditional communities, and key ecosystems such as the Amazon.But as the process moves forward slowly, the impacts continue to worsen every day. The urgency is not legal; it is human. Every unanswered cycle is another cycle of drought, biodiversity loss, and mounting violations. In this case, making a decision is not just an institutional matter; it is a matter of life expectancy for those who depend on the river.What happened with Belo Monte has become a symbol. It is a clear example of how projects marketed as “clean energy” can have profound and lasting impacts when they disregard human rights. At a time when the world is seeking energy solutions to address the climate crisis, we cannot repeat old patterns of injustice. Learn More
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Santa Marta and the End of Fossil Fuels: From “Yes” to “How”
The First International Conference on the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels has concluded in Santa Marta, Colombia. And all signs point to this initiative being here to stay.Many aspects deserve attention in this process launched by Colombia and the Netherlands. Are we witnessing the first step toward a new era?While the world is still processing what has happened and awaits the official report from the co-hosting countries in the coming months, we offer an early analysis. The OriginsThe Santa Marta conference was a response to the frustration caused by three decades of international climate negotiations—at the successive Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—failing to directly address the primary and undisputed cause of the climate crisis: fossil fuels. And it was about time.Since 1992, the international community has negotiated emissions targets and market mechanisms without ever facing the elephant in the room. The words "oil," "coal," and "fuels" do not appear in the Paris Agreement. It wasn’t until 2021, at the Glasgow COP, that fossil fuels were acknowledged for the first time as causing climate change, but only a gradual reduction in coal was called for. In 2023, in Dubai, the greatest progress was made: the phrase "transitioning away from fossil fuels." And in 2025, in Belém, not even that could be maintained. But at least that frustration helped spark the Santa Marta conference, which was precisely the opposite: 57 countries representing a third of global GDP sat down to discuss how to phase out fossil fuels, not whether to do so. If it amounts to nothing more, this conference was at least a relief, a sign of sanity in a world that sometimes is truly hard to understand.And the discussion wasn't just about the "what," but also the "how," which includes justice. The official summary document circulated by the host countries discusses territorial plans for a just transition, labor restructuring with the participation of workers and communities, direct access to financing for indigenous peoples, and explicit prevention of "new forms of extractive dependency." Decentralized and community-based energy systems are mentioned as concrete examples of sustainable production.At AIDA, we believe this is a fundamental condition: without justice, there can be no viable transition. It is not merely an ethical or legal imperative; it is also a practical one. When the transition is carried out without involving communities, without safeguarding people and territories, and without a fair distribution of burdens and benefits, it generates resistance that can hinder the projects themselves. The evidence in Latin America speaks for itself.In times when humanity is going through such darkness, it is hard to be optimistic. Perhaps in this case, there are reasons to be so. A war that, paradoxically, shows the way forwardWith the war in the Middle East as a backdrop, the Santa Marta conference took on an unprecedented sense of urgency: the disruption to oil and gas supplies that it has caused puts us in a unique situation. Overnight, between 20 and 25% of the world’s oil and gas flow was cut off, wreaking havoc across the globe: skyrocketing living costs, blackouts, and faltering economies. A conflict in one specific part of the world is affecting nearly every economy on the planet.And that shifted the tone of the conversation. The transition is no longer framed solely as a climate or environmental necessity, but as a matter of security and sovereignty. The war demonstrated that relying on fossil fuels makes us tremendously vulnerable. It is time to recognize that the climate emergency and economic stability are on the same side—they are not at odds.Fatih Birol, director of the International Energy Agency, stated from Santa Marta that the war "has broken fossil fuel markets beyond repair," referring to the metaphor of the broken vase. This is not merely an environmentalist position; it is a global assessment. The Revitalization of Santa MartaIn addition to its content, the way the Santa Marta conference unfolded was also surprising and could be considered a breakthrough in climate diplomacy.The fossil fuel lobby was explicitly excluded. Countries that have historically blocked any progress were not invited. And the format of the high-level segment broke with traditional dynamics: instead of the computer-read statements that characterize COPs, ministers and delegates sat in small circles under Chatham House rules, without screens, alongside representatives of civil society and indigenous peoples under the same conditions. It didn’t happen at the end, when no one is listening anymore, but rather by setting the tone from the very beginning.Tzeporah Berman, chair of the initiative to establish the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, described the experience as "watching a dam break": "All that accumulated experience, knowledge, and passion suddenly translates into concrete steps to phase out polluting fuels." Science at the WheelAmong the concrete outcomes, the launch of the Scientific Panel for Global Energy Transition (SPGET) stands out. In the early years of climate negotiations, science led the way: COPs opened with an update on the latest scientific findings, and decisions were built upon that foundation. Over time, this approach eroded. Countries with fossil fuel interests gradually diluted scientific warnings and introduced what was openly called “false solutions” at the Santa Marta conference—such as carbon capture and offsets—to justify continued extraction. The conference set out to put science back in the driver’s seat.The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) continues to produce essential reports, but it has limitations that the SPGET can address. It publishes reports every seven years, a slow process for a crisis that is accelerating. Its summaries for policymakers—which, in practice, are read by governments—are negotiated line by line with government representatives, including those from countries with fossil fuel interests, diluting the conclusions. And the IPCC is not authorized to make policy recommendations to countries. Carlos Nobre, one of the founders of the SPGET, recounted that he once sought to include information on the risks facing the Amazon in an IPCC summary, but a representative from his own country rejected it.The SPGET is completely independent. No government can veto its findings, and it will produce annual updates with concrete policy recommendations to support countries in developing roadmaps aligned with the 1.5°C goal. In terms of its structure, it is co-chaired by a Cameroonian economist (Vera Songwe), a German economist (Ottmar Edenhofer), and a Brazilian energy engineer (Gilberto Jannuzzi). If it works as promised, it could become the scientific arm that the transition needs. Continuity and Structure: A Commitment to the FutureThe Santa Marta conference was not a one-off event, but rather the start of a structured process. To begin with, a second conference has already been confirmed for 2027, co-hosted by Tuvalu and Ireland, cementing the commitment to North-South collaboration. With this in mind, three permanent working groups have been established that will continue their work until the Tuvalu conference.The first line of work will support countries in developing national transition roadmaps aligned with their climate commitments under the Paris Agreement. There are concrete examples: France presented its own roadmap to phase out fossil fuels from its energy mix by 2050—the first proposal of its kind submitted by a developed country. But the plan has been criticized by civil society. It does not address the remediation of territories damaged by decades of extraction, nor does it account for the new pressures that its electrification model could exert on the Global South, from which the vast majority of the minerals needed for batteries, grids, and renewable energy come.Colombia, for its part, presented its own plan at the academic pre-conference, with data showing that the transition would become economically viable starting in 2040.Unlike the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), these roadmaps address fossil fuel production. The NDCs focus on reducing emissions, but they do not commit to closing coal mines or power plants or ending tenders for fossil fuel extraction. However, NDCs also have something that roadmaps lack: legal standing, as they are part of the Paris Agreement. Thus, the promise lies in integrating roadmaps into NDCs, which would result in concrete and binding transition commitments. But, as the French case shows, if the roadmaps do not incorporate the remediation of affected territories or the supply chains that electrification demands, there is a risk of ending up with binding commitments that reinforce an unequal transition rather than correcting it.The second ongoing line of work will address financial barriers—debt, fossil fuel subsidies, and access to capital—with support from IISD, a research center specializing in subsidy policies and climate finance. And the third will seek ways to decarbonize international trade by connecting fossil fuel-producing and -consuming countries so they can work together on the transition, with support from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).In addition, there is the Scientific Panel (SPGET), which will provide the technical foundation for the entire process, and a permanent coordination group between the current co-hosts (Colombia and the Netherlands) and the future co-hosts (Tuvalu and Ireland) to ensure continuity. Everything that emerges from these lines of work will inform the official UN climate negotiations, including COP31, scheduled for November of this year in Turkey.Although there are no binding agreements to show for it, we already have concrete working mechanisms in place among the countries committed to moving forward, including supporting institutions, clear mandates, a second conference to review progress, and a commitment to influence official UN negotiations. It’s a good start, with a structure that sustains itself. What Remains to Be ResolvedThere is one issue that cuts across all of the above: timelines and urgency. We have only just begun discussing roadmaps to phase out fossil fuels, but their implementation should have begun 40 years ago. That delay should set the tone for everything that lies ahead.One area where the Santa Marta conference fell particularly short is financing. The issue—debt, fiscal space, subsidies, and the international financial architecture—was discussed at length, but this failed to translate into clear signals. For a process aimed at coordinating the global phase-out of fossil fuels, the absence of a financial roadmap is a serious limitation.This is nothing new, nor is it a matter of charity. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, enshrined in the UNFCCC itself, establishes that the countries that contributed most to the climate crisis must support those that contributed least and are suffering the most. On this basis, climate finance targets have been set, currently amounting to USD 300 billion annually by 2035, as agreed at COP29. But most of that financing comes in the form of loans, which means that countries in the Global South are taking on debt to solve a problem they did not create. The North’s climate debt to the South paradoxically becomes the South’s financial debt to the North. Thus, a just transition is not possible. And the Santa Marta conference failed to make any progress on this issue.Another structural barrier that was addressed in Santa Marta but still requires further work is the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which allows fossil fuel corporations to sue governments for adopting climate measures. At least $100 billion in compensation has been awarded to companies through international arbitration tribunals. ISDS was included in the official summary of the Santa Marta conference, but with lukewarm language. As long as governments can be sued for billions for closing a coal mine, the transition will not move forward—not for lack of will, but out of fear of lawsuits.Nor was the debate over natural gas as a "transition" fuel resolved. The official document acknowledges that "there were differing perspectives regarding the role of transition fuels and technologies"—a step forward achieved thanks to pressure from civil society, given the number of countries that openly promote gas as a solution. But gas is a fossil fuel, and methane leaks from it exacerbate global warming. Presenting it as a "transition" fuel only deepens dependence and delays the transition.Finally, an analysis from Latin America reveals a significant practical inconsistency: the gap between what countries say and what they do. The Mexican government actively participated in the conference while also establishing a committee to assess the viability of "sustainable" fracking. The Brazilian government, guardian of the Amazon, continues to auction off oil wells. And Colombia, host of the conference, announced that it seeks to expand the extractive frontier in the Caribbean Sea. It seems that different branches of the same government are acting with entirely contradictory objectives. The problem is that this undermines the credibility of the process, which is crucial for a coalition such as the one being sought.That said, perhaps it was too much to expect that the first conference of its kind—which sought and succeeded in laying the groundwork for a new process—would provide all the answers to the crisis of our times. The Santa Marta conference served to identify the problems, establish lines of action, and build trust. The next step cannot wait much longer. By the 2027 conference in Tuvalu, there should be no unresolved issues left, especially regarding financing. A plan without financing, no matter how good or well thought out it may be, cannot get off the ground. From a Coal Port to a Sinking Island The conference in Santa Marta, a major coal port in Colombia, has come to a close, and the next stop is Tuvalu, a small Pacific island nation facing an existential threat from rising sea levels. The route is symbolic: from a country that exports coal to one that is disappearing due to the global warming caused by burning that very coal. That these two nations are now working together to lay the groundwork for a change in course is precisely what we need: to acknowledge the past and look to the future with solidarity.The First International Conference on the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels could go down in history as the cornerstone of a new era. Let’s keep building on this foundation.
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Let's talk about project closure and responsible exit
No mining, fossil fuel extraction or power generation project lasts forever. Their useful life is determined by internal factors, such as the quantity of resource reserves, and external factors, such as declining demand or financial problems.But no matter how long a project lasts or how it is affected, its promoters—whether public or private—must provide for a closure and responsible exit process that considers the natural environment and affected communities, and that is desired and promoted by all stakeholders.This issue is even more relevant in the context of actions needed to address the climate crisis, largely related to the energy transition, which generally implies the substitution of fossil fuel extraction and use projects, as well as the promotion of low-emission renewable energies associated with mineral extraction. In both scenarios, closure and exit issues are of great importance.In the first, it is necessary to incorporate concrete and enforceable commitments to close down and move on from existing projects. In the second, these requirements should be built in from the planning and pre-feasibility stages and should also be included in the environmental impact assessments and subsequent stages.In all projects, the role of the promoters is essential. Likewise, the obligation of the state to supervise and monitor is of great importance in order to protect and guarantee the rights of those who may be affected. In some cases, the responsible exit also includes other key actors that are part of the value and supply chains of the projects: investors, financiers, insurers, suppliers, distributors and buyers, among others.Therefore, the discussion of project closure and responsible exit is essential to environmental protection and climate management in Latin America.What do we mean by project closure and exit?All mining and energy projects have different phases in their life cycle: initiation, planning, execution, monitoring and control, closure, and post-closure. In turn, they have supply and value chains that, as we have said, involve actors from different sectors.In this context, closure refers to the stage of a project in which it ceases to operate and is terminated. Exit, on the other hand, refers to the decision and subsequent process in which the different actors in the project's value and supply chain, in their own roles, completely disengage from the project. What does it mean for a closing and exit process to be responsible?There is currently no consensus on the definition and scope of responsible exit and fair project closure processes. Sometimes these terms are used indiscriminately, which can lead to confusion about the responsibilities of the actors involved and the scope of the processes to be carried out. However, there are elements that allow these concepts to be explained precisely:Responsible and fair project closure is a planned, upfront process that should be considered from the earliest stages of a project and continually updated as the project evolves. Responsible closure ensures a planned, coordinated and participatory cessation of activities and dismantling, and guarantees the right to a healthy environment.The planning and development of a closure plan should focus on risk management as well as impact prevention and mitigation. This will ensure a responsible closure in which the affected areas can be readapted and made safe for both nature and communities, while allowing the ecosystems to recover their functions.The general obligation of the project developer is to properly identify the impacts that the project may cause and to adequately and timely comply with the measures approved by the State in its environmental management instruments.The main obligation of the State (in addition to its general regulatory duty) is to supervise and monitor the project to verify compliance with the developer's obligations and to prevent environmental and/or social damage.The role of other actors in the value and supply chain is to act with due diligence, to use their influence to encourage the promoter to comply with its obligations and, in the event of non-compliance, to act within their role and influence to ensure that the necessary corrective measures are taken.Responsible and fair exit refers to the process undertaken by the various actors in the value and supply chain when they decide to fully divest from a project, considering the responsibilities inherent in their role, which include fulfilling their obligations with respect to human rights and due diligence. In Latin America, there has been important progress in regulating aspects related to the permitting, commissioning and implementation of mining and energy projects. However, experience has shown that there are significant challenges in ensuring that the closure and exit processes are responsible for the ecosystems and communities involved.To learn more about this issue, see our report Closure and Responsible Exit. A requirement for environmental and climate justice in Latin America (in Spanish).In the following video, we explain the main findings of the report, which documents and analyzes cases in several countries across the continent:
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How much water is used to produce energy?
Water and energy go hand in hand. Processes such as gas extraction, oil refining, and hydroelectric power plant operations all require water. Thus, as energy demand increases, so does the need for water to generate it.This leads to environmental and social impacts, including the depletion of water sources and the pollution of rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water.Understanding the connection between water and energy production gives us a broader perspective on what our water consumption entails.Conserving water also means reducing our energy consumption, exploring more sustainable energy generation options, and demanding that energy be produced in a clean and fair manner. The water footprint of energyWater is essential for energy production. But not all sources consume the same amount of water, so their environmental impact varies. To generate 1 megawatt—enough to power 1,000 homes for one hour—here is how many liters of water are consumed by different sources of electricity: But water use goes beyond that. In addition to electricity generation, the energy sector uses freshwater—with various socio-environmental impacts—in its various production processes: Conventional thermoelectric power plantsIn these plants, water is heated to high temperatures—by burning coal, gas, or oil—to produce steam, which drives turbines to generate electricity.Water is also used in thermal power plants to cool the power-generating units. Hydroelectric power plantsThey use the force of water to drive turbines that generate electricity. By damming or diverting the natural flow of rivers, streams, and lakes, they fragment habitats, leading to the displacement and decline of species. They also impact water quality.Furthermore, they cause the forced displacement of communities living near water sources and who depend on them. Fuel extraction and productionWater is used in coal mining and in drilling wells for oil and gas. In many cases, these processes generate wastewater.Water is also needed to refine oil and gas before they can be used as fuels. Coal miningIn addition to using water to extract the mineral, it can be used—along with chemicals—to remove sulfur and impurities before combustion. Coal mining using explosives generates debris that can contaminate local water sources and even block them. Coal can be transported to the power plant using a method that pumps the finely ground coal mixed with water through pipes. Hydraulic fracturing (fracking)In this technique, a mixture consisting of more than 90% water, along with chemicals and sand, is injected at high pressure into underground rock formations to fracture them and access the oil or gas they contain.The wastewater from this mixture remains underground and can contaminate the groundwater that feeds nearby aquifers. Renewable energySolar photovoltaic and wind power do not use water to operate, but they require supplies and materials whose production requires water.A notable example is lithium, which is used to manufacture the batteries that store the energy generated by these sources. Its extraction involves massive water consumption from salt flats, one of its primary sources:2,000 liters of water for every ton of lithium produced in evaporation ponds.Water is used to extract lithium carbonate and separate it from the remaining compound.Water is lost during brine pumping. Understanding how much water is needed to generate the energy we use gives us a broader perspective on the water our energy consumption entails.Reducing our energy needs and promoting sustainable and equitable energy production are also ways to conserve water. If you'd like to learn more about this topic, here is a list of the sources we consulted: - "How It Works: Water for Electricity", Union of Concerned Scientists.- "El uso del agua: una planta de energía termoeléctrica", USGS.- "¿Por qué la termoeléctrica no es energía limpia?", J. Soto, Greenpeace.- "How much water does the typical hydraulically fractured well require?", U.S. Geological Survey.- "Hydraulic Fracturing and its Impact on Water Resources", Water Footprint Calculator.- "The intensification of the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing", Science Advances.- "Efectos del represamiento de ríos en países de América Latina y el Caribe sobre la biodiversidad, el agua, la alimentación y la energía", A. Stehr, CEPAL.- "Las represas y su impacto en la naturaleza", WWF.- "¿Qué es el litio, para qué sirve y de dónde se extrae en la Argentina?", Florencia Ballarino, Chequeado.- "El impacto de la minería de litio en los Humedales Altoandinos", Wetlands International.- "'Triángulo de litio: la amenaza a los salares de Bolivia, Chile y Argentina", Rodolfo Chisleanchi, Mongabay Latam. Data on water consumption in electricity generation obtained from: - "A simple model to help understand water use at power plants", A. Delgado y H. J. Herzog, MIT.- "How it Works: Water for Natural Gas", Union of Concerned Scientists.- "Hidropower Explained", U.S. Energy Information Administration.- "How it Works: Water for Nuclear", Union of Concerned Scientists.- "Geothermal Energu Factsheet", University of Michigan.- "Life cycle water use for electricity generation: a review and harmonization of literature estimates", J. Meldrum y otros, Environmental Research Letters.
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