Climate Change

March 10 2025 Climate Change, Freshwater Sources, Mining

Declaration of a Temporary Reserve Area in the Santurbán Páramo is a victory for the defense of water in Latin America

Civil society organizations celebrate the measure taken by the Colombian Ministry of the Environment, which involves a two year suspension of Canadian company Aris Mining's gold mining project in the páramo.Bogotá, Colombia. The Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA), the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) - Mining and Trade Project, MiningWatch Canada, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and Common Frontiers Canada celebrate the Colombian Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development’s (MADS) resolution that declares the western side of the Santurbán massif a temporary renewable natural resource reserve area. This major step strengthens the protection of one of the most emblematic high-altitude Andean wetlands, known as páramo, and its related ecosystems, which are fundamental for climate change adaptation and water security in the region for an estimated 2 million people.Resolution 0221, issued on March 3, 2025 by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MADS), delimits and protects an area of 75,344.65 hectares, ensuring a two year provisional suspension of the Soto Norte gold mining project owned by Canadian company Aris Mining and its Colombian subsidiary, Sociedad Minera de Santander S.A.S. (Minesa), which puts Santurbán at risk. Citing the precautionary principle, the resolution prohibits the granting of “new mining concessions, special exploration and exploitation contracts, (...) as well as new environmental permits or licenses for the exploration or exploitation of minerals” in the area until the necessary technical studies are carried out toward its definitive protection. This resolution does not affect agricultural, livestock or tourism activity in the area.However, we are concerned that the resolution leaves in force the concession contract with Calimineros, which has had a subcontract with Minesa to formalize [its small-scale mining activities] since 2020, and from which Minesa promises to buy and process mineralized material. We encourage the competent authorities to suspend evaluation of its environmental license application and extension of the formalization subcontract, due to potential environmental impacts on Santurbán and because it is effectively part of the Soto Norte project.The páramo and related ecosystems are highly sensitive, recognized for their role in water regulation, carbon capture, and the conservation of endemic biodiversity. The removal of vegetation cover and the fragmentation of ecosystems that mining in Santurbán would generate could affect the ecological balance, biodiversity, and the provision of ecosystem services essential for life; acidify and reduce the amount of available fresh-water; and break the ecological interconnectivity with other biomes and ecosystems, destroying their capacity to sequester carbon and causing irreparable damage.For these reasons, we appreciate that the resolution seeks to prevent mining development in this highly sensitive and environmentally important area, preventing degradation of the watersheds that arise from Santurbán and preserving the water cycle.Sebastián Abad-Jara, an attorney for AIDA, pointed out that "by protecting Santurbán, Colombia ratifies its commitment to meet global environmental goals in terms of biodiversity, climate and wetlands, and sets a high bar for the governments of other countries where these ecosystems are similarly threatened by mining activity, such as Peru and Ecuador.""We celebrate this declaration as an important first step toward the consolidation of the western side of the Santurbán massif as a permanent reserve area, definitively protecting this important water source, vital for all who depend on it," said Jen Moore, associate fellow at IPS - Mining and Trade Project.Viviana Herrera, Latin America Program Coordinator for MiningWatch Canada, added that "this resolution is the result of the Committee for the Defence of Water and Páramo of Santurbán’s hard work, which has faced harassment and intimidation for its work in defense of the páramo, as well as disinformation campaigns about the supposed harmful effects of the resolution on agricultural activity."AIDA, IPS-Mining and Trade Project, MiningWatch Canada, CIEL and Common Frontiers Canada support the adoption of this protection measure for Santurbán. We also encourage the national and local government to carry out the necessary technical studies for its definitive protection, and to take preventive measures to avoid the cumulative environmental impacts of mining in the area given other projects that already have mining licenses. Furthermore, we reiterate the urgency of adopting measures to protect environment defenders in Colombia who stand up for the páramo.The Santurbán experience provides valuable lessons and should serve as an example to promote legislation for environmental protection in Latin America that focuses on the human right to water and the balance and integrity of fragile ecosystems, such as the páramo and other high-altitude ecosystems.#OurGoldIsWater Press contactsVictor Quintanilla (Mexico), AIDA, [email protected], +5215570522107Jennifer Moore, IPS, [email protected], +12027049011 (prensa IPS)Viviana Herrera, Mining Watch Canada, [email protected], +14389931264Alexandra Colón-Amil, CIEL, [email protected], +12024550253

February 24 2025 Climate Change, Toxic Pollution, Oceans

Learn about the negotiations to reduce maritime shipping emissions

The decarbonization of productive and economic activities is essential and urgent to address the triple crisis –climate, pollution and biodiversity loss– that the world is facing.In maritime shipping –which moves 10 billion tons of cargo each year and accounts for 2.9% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including carbon dioxide (CO2)– the global need to reduce and eventually eliminate these emissions is being addressed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN specialized agency responsible for setting standards for safe, efficient and environmentally sound shipping.The move toward decarbonization is critical because without significant change, shipping emissions could increase by as much as 50% by 2050.The IMO has a revised emissions reduction strategy that was agreed in 2023 by the 175 countries that make up the organization. It is expected to reduce emissions from the sector by up to 30% by 2030, 80% by 2040 and reach net zero by around 2050. Implementation of the strategy is currently the subject of international negotiations.AIDA is participating in these negotiations as part of the Clean Shipping Coalition, an international coalition of organizations. In addition, AIDA is coordinating efforts with Ocean Conservancy and Fundación Cethus to generate advocacy with Latin American countries and to collaborate with updated technical information on the progress of the negotiations and their implications for the region.The decarbonization of global shipping and its economic impact is a very important discussion for Latin America and the Caribbean. It is necessary that all countries and economic sectors align themselves with clear targets and that all impacts are assessed equally and fairly, as well as the ways in which countries can mitigate them. Read on to learn more about this important process. What measures are being discussed to reduce emissions from maritime shipping?Negotiations are underway at the international level to select the package of measures needed to meet the 2023 targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from shipping. This package will include both technical and economic measures. Its final structure will be decided in April this year at the IMO headquarters in London, marking a global milestone in the fight against the climate crisis.Technical measures include a global fuel standard, carbon capture on ships, energy efficiency measures for the fuels used, and reductions in ship speed. They all aim to make maritime transport as efficient as possible in terms of the fuels used and to gradually phase out the use of the most polluting fuels. This means using the least amount of energy, emitting the least amount of carbon dioxide and keeping the sector in operation.In addition to technical measures, economic measures are proposed to put a price on carbon emissions from maritime transport. Increasing the efficiency of ships is expected to have not only a technological component but also a market incentive. This combination is crucial for achieving emission reduction targets, as it will provide both the public and private sectors with the necessary resources:The economic resources to invest in the new technologies, new fuels, and other investments needed for the energy transition.An economic stimulus to close the current cost gap between fossil fuels and near-zero emission clean technologies. To define a price for carbon dioxide emissions, there are two main proposals:The first has a flexible structure with respect to emissions. In its simplest form, it takes account of differences in emissions when implementing the measure. To this end, a "permissible limit" of carbon dioxide emissions is envisaged, with ships being divided into those below and those above the limit. The former could receive a financial reward, and the latter would pay a fee for the carbon dioxide emitted under a system of emission quotas. In this sense, although there is a mechanism to regulate emissions below the set limit, the tolerance of these limits offers the possibility of an accelerated reduction, which could delay the energy transition that the climate crisis requires.The second has a universal structure, i.e. a fixed price for all CO2 emissions generated by the operation of the maritime fleet. The aim is to create a market stimulus that will increase the demand for new low-emission technologies (new ships and fuels) and encourage maritime operators to purchase them in order to avoid paying a fee. This measure is expected to provide more accurate monitoring of total emissions from ships, motivate a faster and more pronounced energy transition, and collect and then redistribute a significant number of economic resources among maritime operators and countries to mitigate the disproportionate costs and negative impacts of the decarbonization process. What does decarbonizing shipping mean for Latin America and the Caribbean?According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change-related disasters, so actions aimed at achieving decarbonization targets in different sectors of the regional economy are essential to address the climate crisis.On the other hand, actions specifically aimed at decarbonizing maritime transport will have different impacts in the short, medium and long term in each of the countries of the continent. For example, the choice of one or the other proposal for the payment of a tariff for the sector's CO2 emissions - the flexible modality or the fixed price - will have a different impact in each country. What all scenarios have in common is that the region will be strongly affected by the process of decarbonizing maritime transport.In this context, it is important for countries to identify the scenarios that allow them a greater range of actions to compensate for these impacts and to ensure that the transition is equitable and fair, without leaving any country behind.In economic terms, the introduction of a universal price on CO2 emissions would allow States to receive part of the economic resources generated to compensate and mitigate the effects of decarbonization. The amounts and forms of this transfer of resources will be agreed within the IMO. The combination of more ambitious measures (technical and economic) is expected to raise up to $120 billion annually in the coming years. The flexible proposal for paying for emissions does not include mechanisms for redistributing resources, as these would go directly to ship operators and fuel producers. This would leave countries to mitigate the impact of decarbonization with their own resources.From an environmental perspective, without the incentive of a universal price, there is a risk that the flexible scheme will indirectly encourage the continued use of fuels that generate CO2 emissions, particularly in regions with limited economic resources to invest in the least polluting state-of-the-art technology. This would result in a delay in achieving emission reduction targets for the world's shipping fleet and would move countries away from meeting their climate change commitments under the IMO.In general, the costs of reducing CO2 emissions from shipping and other sectors, which are at the root of the current climate crisis, are a reality for all countries, although the impact varies by region. The active participation of Latin America and the Caribbean in the international discussions on this issue throughout 2025 is essential to ensure that the energy transition and the reduction of maritime emissions are fair and equitable. It is important that the countries of the continent adopt a position that allows them to protect their economic and environmental interests from the economic consequences of this process. If the IMO's decarbonization strategy does not live up to its ambitions, we will have a shipping industry that exacerbates the climate crisis and its impacts. The success of this strategy will be the achievement of a global consensus on environmental considerations. The equity and fairness of the transition must be one of the key elements. Recognizing the differentiated impacts of maritime decarbonization measures and their compensation, especially in the most affected countries, will ensure a triumph based on criteria of justice and environmental equity.

January 31 2025 Climate Change, Human Rights, Freshwater Sources

Life in Andean wetlands at risk from extractivism

The expansion of industrial extraction of lithium and other minerals for the energy transition of the global north threatens wetlands in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile. These delicate ecosystems are an abundant source of life and fundamental for human subsistence, environmental balance and for mitigating and adapting to the climate crisis.The Andean wetlands - including salt flats, lakes and lagoons - of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile are at serious risk due to the advance of the extraction of lithium and other minerals demanded for the energy transition in the countries of the global north. The Andean Wetlands Alliance warns of this threat to these ecosystems where life abounds and which are key to human subsistence and biodiversity in general and to the fight against the climate crisis.This year, the Convention on Wetlands proposes as the theme for World Wetlands Day: “Protecting wetlands for our common future”. This theme highlights the importance of collective action to protect these ecosystems, on which the future of humanity depends.According to United Nations data, although they cover only 6% of the earth's surface, wetlands are home to 40% of all plant and animal species. And, worldwide, more than 1 billion people (one eighth of the Earth's population) live in rural and urban areas that depend on these ecosystems for their livelihoods. However, with a 35% global loss in the last 50 years (since 1970), wetlands are the most threatened ecosystem, disappearing three times faster than forests.In Latin America, the Andean wetlands of the Gran Atacama region - located in the border area of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile - are home to unique species of flora and fauna, especially adapted to extreme climatic conditions, as well as microorganisms that absorb carbon dioxide and release oxygen. Its high capacity to purify and store water guarantees the supply of the resource for communities and species, also generating conditions for adaptation to the climate crisis.However, due to the presence of large quantities of lithium in these wetlands - the three countries concentrate more than 53% of the resources (potentially exploitable material) of the mineral - there is great pressure on them: corporate and state actors have developed a growing and massive mining industry to meet the demand for lithium in the global north, oriented to the manufacture of electric vehicles and energy storage from renewable sources, among other purposes.On the other hand, national and provincial governments see the industry as an opportunity to attract investment and strengthen their economies, for which they relax or poorly implement regulations that require an adequate analysis of the environmental and social impacts of projects. Likewise, there are no processes of consultation and free, prior and informed consent with the indigenous communities living in the territories. Nor are the rights of access to information, citizen participation, access to justice in environmental matters, or a safe environment for environmental defenders guaranteed.One of the main impacts of this type of mining (lithium extraction) is on water, a central element of Andean wetlands. Lithium is extracted from the water beneath the salt flats, a process that requires both saltwater and freshwater. Andean wetlands exist in regions where survival depends on the scarce water that defines them. The expansion of extractivism in the Gran Atacama regionArgentinaAccording to official data, the country has a portfolio of more than 50 lithium projects in different stages of progress, mainly located in the provinces of Salta, Catamarca and Jujuy. Three of them are in production and export stage (a fourth project started production in July 2024), four are under construction and more than 40 are at different stages of progress (prospecting/exploration/feasibility), mostly in advanced exploration phase. In Salta and Jujuy operate large companies such as Pan American Energy, Pluspetrol and Tecpetrol, historically linked to the oil and gas industry, which are now expanding their presence in renewable energy sectors, with a marked interest in lithium extraction.However, through an amparo action filed against the authorities and government of the province of Jujuy, it has come to light that there are more than 40 mining projects in the Salinas Grandes Basin and Guayatayoc Lagoon alone, an endorheic basin where more than thirty native communities belonging to the Kolla and Atacama peoples/nations live. To date, their progress and whether there are other projects is unknown because access to public environmental information is restricted and is not provided in a complete and timely manner, in breach of national regulations and international standards. In the Salar del Hombre Muerto, Catamarca, is the oldest lithium mining enclave in the country. The salt flat has been exploited since 1996 by the company Livent (now Arcadium Lithium), causing the total and irreversible drying up of the vega of the Trapiche River. In March 2024, the Supreme Court of Catamarca ordered a halt to mining activity in this salar until a cumulative environmental impact assessment is conducted. BoliviaIn the Salar de Uyuni, the largest in the world, resources of 23 million tons of lithium have been identified. And there are 26 other salt flats that, by regulation, are reserved for the exploitation of the mineral; exploration activities are being carried out in six of them. In Bolivia, lithium is state-owned. The country has a state-owned exploitation plant that began operating in 2024 at 20% of its capacity. In 2012 and 2018, two public consultations were held for state-owned plants, but these excluded indigenous and native communities with titled collective lands. Some communities have informally denounced a significant depletion of springs and water wells. The degradation of the Salar de Chalviri and the overexploitation of lithium and boron in the Salar de Capina have also been denounced.Since 2023, agreements have been signed and exploration and camp installation activities have begun with one Russian and two Chinese companies. These agreements have resulted in two contracts, signed at the end of 2024 and pending approval by the Legislative Assembly, with the Russian company Uranium One Group for a plant in the Salar de Uyuni and with the Chinese consortium CBC Hong Kong (CATL-BRUMP-CMOC companies) for two other plants in the same salar. Also at the end of last year, a second international call was launched for the exploitation of four other salt flats (Empexa, Capina, Cañapa and Chiguana), which has resulted in the signing of agreements with the companies EAU Lithium Pty Ltd (Australia), Tecpetrol S.A. (Argentina) and Geolith Actaris (France). These agreements, contracts and processes have been developed without prior consultation processes and with a lack of transparency. ChileThe Salar de Atacama basin is home to more than 90% of Chile's lithium reserves and was one of the first to be exploited by the mining industry. Currently, there are four major mining operations in the Salar Atacama, located in the Antofagasta Region: lithium extraction by Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile (SQM) and Albemaerle, under contracts with the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), which involves the extraction of more than 2,000 liters of water per second; and the parallel extraction of copper by Minera Escondida and Minera Zaldívar, which extract more than 1,400 liters of fresh water per second, aggravating the already critical water crisis in the area. The Atacameño Community of Peine, who live in the salar basin, has taken legal action denouncing the overexploitation of their aquifers, while in Calama, citizen movements are demanding water governance in the face of uncontrolled extraction by mining companies. In 2015, a government-appointed committee recognized that brine extraction has adverse effects on the ecosystem, but instead of regulating its use, it confirmed the government's long-standing policy of regulating lithium production.In Chile, the government has exclusive property rights over lithium under Decree Law 2886 (1979). This means that state institutions, particularly CORFO, set the conditions under which private companies operate in the salars. In 1979, following U.S. directives, the Chilean government - the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet - declared lithium a “strategic mineral” and took measures to safeguard long-term reserves by limiting production through quotas accredited by the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission.The National Lithium Strategy, launched in 2023, seeks to expand state exploitation, including new projects in the Maricunga and Pedernales salt flats. Chile concentrates 36% of global lithium production and, with at least 31 new green hydrogen projects in the pipeline, pressure on water resources will increase exponentially. It is known that, since 2013, on SQM's property, 32.4% of the carob trees (Prosopis chilenis) have dried up due to lack of water. The carob tree is a native tree, resistant to drought and with very deep roots that allow it to survive in this environment. Press contacts Víctor Quintanilla, Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA), [email protected], +52 5570522107Rocío Wischñevsky, Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN), Argentina, [email protected], +54 1159518538Verónica Gostissa, Asamblea Pucará (Argentina), [email protected], +54 93834771717Juan Donoso, Formando Rutas (Chile), [email protected], +4915780743628

January 20 2025 Climate Change, Human Rights, Indigenous Rights

Let's talk about project closure and responsible exit

No mining, fossil fuel extraction or power generation project lasts forever. Their useful life is determined by internal factors, such as the quantity of resource reserves, and external factors, such as declining demand or financial problems.But no matter how long a project lasts or how it is affected, its promoters—whether public or private—must provide for a closure and responsible exit process that considers the natural environment and affected communities, and that is desired and promoted by all stakeholders.This issue is even more relevant in the context of actions needed to address the climate crisis, largely related to the energy transition, which generally implies the substitution of fossil fuel extraction and use projects, as well as the promotion of low-emission renewable energies associated with mineral extraction. In both scenarios, closure and exit issues are of great importance.In the first, it is necessary to incorporate concrete and enforceable commitments to close down and move on from existing projects. In the second, these requirements should be built in from the planning and pre-feasibility stages and should also be included in the environmental impact assessments and subsequent stages.In all projects, the role of the promoters is essential. Likewise, the obligation of the state to supervise and monitor is of great importance in order to protect and guarantee the rights of those who may be affected. In some cases, the responsible exit also includes other key actors that are part of the value and supply chains of the projects: investors, financiers, insurers, suppliers, distributors and buyers, among others.Therefore, the discussion of project closure and responsible exit is essential to environmental protection and climate management in Latin America.What do we mean by project closure and exit?All mining and energy projects have different phases in their life cycle: initiation, planning, execution, monitoring and control, closure, and post-closure. In turn, they have supply and value chains that, as we have said, involve actors from different sectors.In this context, closure refers to the stage of a project in which it ceases to operate and is terminated. Exit, on the other hand, refers to the decision and subsequent process in which the different actors in the project's value and supply chain, in their own roles, completely disengage from the project. What does it mean for a closing and exit process to be responsible?There is currently no consensus on the definition and scope of responsible exit and fair project closure processes. Sometimes these terms are used indiscriminately, which can lead to confusion about the responsibilities of the actors involved and the scope of the processes to be carried out. However, there are elements that allow these concepts to be explained precisely:Responsible and fair project closure is a planned, upfront process that should be considered from the earliest stages of a project and continually updated as the project evolves. Responsible closure ensures a planned, coordinated and participatory cessation of activities and dismantling, and guarantees the right to a healthy environment.The planning and development of a closure plan should focus on risk management as well as impact prevention and mitigation. This will ensure a responsible closure in which the affected areas can be readapted and made safe for both nature and communities, while allowing the ecosystems to recover their functions.The general obligation of the project developer is to properly identify the impacts that the project may cause and to adequately and timely comply with the measures approved by the State in its environmental management instruments.The main obligation of the State (in addition to its general regulatory duty) is to supervise and monitor the project to verify compliance with the developer's obligations and to prevent environmental and/or social damage.The role of other actors in the value and supply chain is to act with due diligence, to use their influence to encourage the promoter to comply with its obligations and, in the event of non-compliance, to act within their role and influence to ensure that the necessary corrective measures are taken.Responsible and fair exit refers to the process undertaken by the various actors in the value and supply chain when they decide to fully divest from a project, considering the responsibilities inherent in their role, which include fulfilling their obligations with respect to human rights and due diligence.In Latin America, there has been important progress in regulating aspects related to the permitting, commissioning and implementation of mining and energy projects. However, experience has shown that there are significant challenges in ensuring that the closure and exit processes are responsible for the ecosystems and communities involved.To learn more about this issue, see our report Closure and Responsible Exit. A requirement for environmental and climate justice in Latin America (in Spanish).

December 04 2024 Climate Change, Human Rights

Session 2 of the 2024 GCF Watch International Webinar Series

Best Practices for Effective Climate Action: Insights from the GCF and Lessons for other Funds For the fourth consecutive year, we invite all civil society members following the GCF and other funds under the UNFCCC to attend two dynamic sessions on October 9th and December 4th.This year, we are excited to introduce a more interactive format, featuring presentations and live interviews between a moderator and CSO representatives. This second and final session reflected on the outcomes of COP29, focusing on key decisions related to climate finance. We also discussed lessons learned from GCF monitoring, with a spotlight on gender, indigenous peoples, information disclosure and redress, among other critical issues. PresenterBertha Argueta, Germanwatch: Climate finance under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement after COP29. What's next for the NCQG? IntervieweesNatalia Daza, GCF Gender Monitor for Latin America.Tunga Rai, member of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group (IPAG).Florencia Ortúzar, regional node for the GCF Watch.Bertha Argueta, alternate active observer for the GCF. Moderation: Daan Robben, Both ENDS. Recording

December 04 2024 Climate Change, Human Rights

COP29: Climate target disappoints and invites us to look elsewhere for hope

The twenty-ninth United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), held in Baku, Azerbaijan, was dubbed "the COP of finance" because the most anticipated decision was the establishment of the New Collective and Quantifiable Global Climate Finance Goal (NCQG), the amount that developed countries would pledge to finance climate action in developing countries. This issue grabbed all the attention, overshadowing everything else.In addition, the recent re-election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, accompanied by his threat to abandon the Paris Agreement and reverse the country's climate action, set the tone for the event.The negotiations, which took place from November 11 to 22, were intense and ended almost two full days late, with the approval of a text that caused great disappointment.However, the invitation is not to be blinded by disappointment. As much as we want, demand and hope, the international climate negotiations are not delivering what we so desperately need. Let us look for hope in what is happening and working, such as local, community-led projects and the work of civil society that is not giving up.Here is a review of COP29 based on what was agreed on climate finance and other relevant issues. A new climate finance targetThe mandate was clear: the new target should exceed the previous one of $100 billion per year and respond to the needs and priorities of developing countries. But while developing countries demanded $1.3 trillion per year, the offer was a mere $300 billion (less than a third and just 12% of the global military budget in 2023) by 2035. "Is this a joke?" exclaimed the head of the Bolivian delegation at a press conference.Developing countries also demanded that financing be adequate, i.e. based mainly on public resources, in the form of grants and highly concessional instruments that would not add to the heavy debts they already carry. They also called for the explicit inclusion of loss and damage as one of the objectives of financing (along with mitigation and adaptation), as well as a specific target for adaptation.None of this was achieved. The target was left open to private financing, further diluting the responsibility of developed countries. There was no specific target for adaptation, nor was there any mention of loss and damage. In case there was any doubt, all references to human rights were removed from the final text.The only saving grace was a call to mobilize $1.3 trillion in climate finance annually from a broad base of sources through the so-called Baku-Belem Roadmap, with a view to achieving this goal by 2035. However, this is a "call" and not a binding commitment, the concrete results of which will depend on political will in the coming years. Global stocktaking and gender issuesNo significant progress was made on the results of last year's Global Stocktaking on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly on the transition away from fossil fuels. The issue was deferred to COP30, which will be held next year in the Brazilian city of Belém do Pará.While there has also been insufficient progress on gender issues, some progress should be recognized, such as the extension of the Lima Work Program to 10 years, which lays the groundwork for the development of a Gender Action Plan and provides an opportunity to further deepen the integration of gender into climate action, particularly as countries develop updates to their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).In addition, the text of the NCQG recognizes women as beneficiaries of funds but fails to ensure that the specific circumstances and intersectional discrimination that many women face are addressed. Carbon marketsWhat did see advances during the negotiations were carbon markets, with the approval of the rules for a global market. Carbon markets are trading systems where carbon credits are bought and sold. Each credit represents one ton of CO₂, or its equivalent in other greenhouse gases, removed from the atmosphere. The credits are generated by projects that reduce emissions (such as forest conservation, renewable energy, or energy efficiency). The buyers are polluting companies that want to offset their emissions in order to remain in compliance.The issue has been under discussion for more than a decade due to the difficulty of ensuring the credibility of the system to reduce emissions. Although it is the last outstanding issue of the Paris Agreement, signed more than 10 years ago, civil society is not celebrating. These markets allow companies to continue polluting if they pay for carbon reductions elsewhere in the world. Methane emission reductionsA promising development was the signing of the Declaration on Methane Reduction from Organic Waste by more than 30 countries. The signatories, representing nearly half of global emissions, committed to setting sector-specific methane reduction targets in their future NDCs, underscoring the importance of organic waste management in the fight against climate change. Closing thoughtsIn the end, the results are not surprising. Conventions on climate change are often not much to celebrate, but we must not forget that they are a unique space where all countries sit down to seek consensus to advance a common goal. Its very existence reflects an intention to acknowledge historical responsibilities in favor of justice and a world where we can live together in harmony. It is a platform from which to push, even if it brings more frustration than results.On the other hand, it is very encouraging and motivating to see civil society in action. Hundreds of representatives from different organizations and movements are doing their best to achieve results that reflect the fulfillment of international commitments of developed countries towards their developing counterparts, the climate and the natural balance of our planet.Finally, the side events that take place parallel to the negotiations are a source of inspiration. On the sidelines, without much fanfare, there are people from communities and indigenous peoples who are implementing climate solutions in their territories, with concrete, successful results. These people, like seeds silently germinating, are a powerful source of hope.

November 27 2024 Climate Change, Human Rights, Indigenous Rights

The ABCs of transition minerals and their role in energy production

By Mayela Sánchez, David Cañas and Javier Oviedo* There is no doubt that we need to move away from fossil fuels to address the climate crisis. But what does it mean to switch to other energy sources?To make a battery or a solar panel, raw materials from nature are also used.Some of these raw materials are minerals which, due to their characteristics and in the context of the energy transition, have been descriptively named transition minerals.What are these minerals, where are they found, and how are they used?Below we answer the most important questions about these mineral resources, because it is crucial to know which natural resources will supply the new energy sources, and to ensure that their extraction respects human rights and planetary limits, so that the energy transition is just. What are transition minerals and why are they called that?They are a group of minerals with a high capacity to store and conduct energy. Because of these properties, they are used in the development of renewable energy technologies, such as solar panels, batteries for electric mobility, or wind turbines.They are so called because they are considered essential for the technological development of renewable energy sources, such as those mentioned above. And in the context of the energy transition, energy sources that use these minerals are the most sought-after to replace fossil energy sources.Transition minerals are also often referred to as "critical" minerals because they are considered strategic to the energy transition. The term "critical" refers to elements that are vital to the economy and national security, but whose supply chain is vulnerable to disruption. This means that transition minerals may be strategic minerals, but not critical in terms of security and the economy.However, given the urgency of climate action, some states and international organizations have classified transition minerals as "critical" minerals in order to promote and facilitate access to these raw materials. What are the most important transition minerals?The most important transition minerals are cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, nickel and rare earth.But there are at least 19 minerals used in various renewable energy technologies: bauxite, cadmium, cobalt, copper, chromium, tin, gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, lithium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, selenium, silicon, tellurium, titanium, zinc, and the "rare" earth. What are "rare" earth elements and why are they so called?The "rare" earth elements are the 16 chemical elements of the lanthanoid or lanthanide group, plus Ithrium (Y), whose chemical behavior is virtually the same as that of the lanthanoids.They are Scandium, Ithrium, Lanthanum, Cerium, Praseodymium, Neodymium, Samarium, Europium, Gadolinium, Terbium, Dysprosium, Holmium, Erbium, Tullium, Iterbium and Lutetium.They are so called because when they were discovered in the 18th and 19th centuries, they were less well known than other elements considered similar, such as calcium. But the name is now outdated.Nor does the term "rare" refer to their abundance, because although they are not usually concentrated in deposits that can be exploited (so their mines are few), even the less abundant elements in this group are much more common than gold. What are transition minerals used for? What technologies are based on transition minerals?The uses of transition minerals in the technological development of renewable energy sources are diverse:Solar technologies: bauxite, cadmium, tin, germanium, gallium, indium, selenium, silicon, tellurium, zinc.Electrical installations: copper.Wind energy: bauxite, copper, chromium, manganese, molybdenum, rare earths, zinc.Energy storage: bauxite, cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, rare earths, titanium.Batteries: cobalt, graphite, lithium, manganese, nickel, rare earths. In addition, they are used in a variety of modern technologies, for example in the manufacture of displays, cell phones, computer hard drives and LED lights, among others. Where are transition minerals found?The geography of transition minerals is broad, ranging from China to Canada, from the United States to Australia. But their extraction has been concentrated in countries of the global south.Several Latin American countries are among the top producers of various transition minerals. These materials are found in complex areas rich in biological and cultural diversity, such as the Amazon and the Andean wetlands.Argentina: lithiumBrazil: aluminum, bauxite, lithium, manganese, rare earths, titaniumBolivia: lithiumChile: copper, lithium, molybdenumColombia: nickelMexico: copper, tin, molybdenum, zincPeru: tin, molybdenum, zinc How do transition minerals support the energy transition and decarbonization?Transition minerals are seen as indispensable links in the energy transition to decarbonization, i.e. the shift away from fossil energy sources.But the global interest in these materials also raises questions about the benefits and challenges of mining transition minerals.The issue has become so relevant that last September, the United Nations Panel on Critical Minerals for Energy Transition issued a set of recommendations and principles to ensure equitable, fair and sustainable management of these minerals.In addition, as a result of the intensification and expansion of their extraction in countries of the region, the issue was brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for the first time on November 15.In a public hearing, representatives of communities and organizations from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Colombia, as well as regional organizations, presented information and testimonies on the environmental and social impacts of transition mineral mining.Given the current energy transition process, it is necessary to know where the resources that will enable the technologies to achieve this transition will come from.The extraction and use of transition minerals must avoid imposing disproportionate environmental and social costs on local communities and ecosystems. *Mayela Sánchez is a digital community specialist at AIDA; David Cañas and Javier Oviedo are scientific advisors.Sources consulted:-Olivera, B., Tornel, C., Azamar, A., Minerales críticos para la transición energética. Conflictos y alternativas hacia una transformación socioecológica, Heinrich Böll Foundation Mexico City/Engenera/UAM-Unidad Xochimilco.-Science History Institute Museum & Library, “History and Future of Rare Earth Elements”.-FIMA NGO, Narratives on the extraction of critical minerals for the energy transition: Critiques from environmental and territorial justice.-Haxel, Hedrick & Orris, “Rare Earth-Elements. Critical Resources for High Technology,” 2005.-USGS 2014, “The Rare-Earth elements. Vital to modern technology and lifestyle”, 2014.-Final Report for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) Thematic Hearing: Minerals for Energy Transition and its Impact on Human Rights in the Americas, 2024.

November 15 2024 Climate Change, Human Rights

Closure and Responsible Exit

A requirement for environmental and climate justice in Latin America No natural resource (material or energy) extraction project lasts forever. Its useful life is subject to many variables, including endogenous factors -such as the amount of resource reserves or the extraction rate- and exogenous factors -such as decisions to address the climate crisis, the decrease in demand, financial problems, etc.- that condition the moment in which the project must close or the moment in which an actor in its value and supply chain must leave. Regardless of the length of the project's useful life or how it may be affected, a responsible closure process with the natural environment and society must be contemplated, which must be desired and promoted by all the stakeholders involved.This issue is even more relevant in the context of the climate crisis we are experiencing, which makes it urgent to implement measures to manage it in the short, medium and long term. Many of the actions required to meet greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation targets are related to energy transition, which implies, in general terms, at least two things: 1) the substitution of fossil fuel extraction and use projects and 2) the promotion of low-emission renewable energies, which are associated with mineral extraction. In both scenarios, closure and exit issues are of great importance.In both extraction and generation projects, the role of their promoters, whether public or private, is essential. Likewise, the obligation of supervision and oversight of the States is very important for the protection and guarantee of the rights of those who may be affected. On occasions, the responsibility of the exit includes other key actors that are part of the value and supply chains of the projects: investors, insurers, distributors and buyers, among others.In Latin America, there have been important advances in regulating aspects related to the authorization, start-up and implementation of mining and energy projects. In these phases, environmental principles such as prevention and precaution, as well as rights such as prior consultation and free, prior and informed consent, and access rights, have played a crucial role in determining the viability and progress of projects, as well as in protecting and guaranteeing the rights of communities in the region. However, experience has shown that there are significant challenges for the closure and exit processes to be responsible with the ecosystems and communities involved. Indeed, the lack of a closure process, as well as the lack of clarity about the obligations surrounding the social transition processes and overcoming the conditions of economic dependence, are complex obstacles that can exacerbate environmental and social impacts. This report arises from the idea of proposing approaches based on law and science to address the closure and responsible exit of projects. To this end, we at the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA), in the period 2022-2024, interviewed various stakeholders1 and systematized 12 cases that exemplify the problematic situation of multiple fossil fuel extraction, mineral and power generation projects, which are in the closure phase or in exit processes in different countries of the region. These cases highlight the current challenges and legal, technical and administrative gaps regarding closure and exit in specific contexts.With this publication, we seek to provide answers to the following questions: what is meant by project closure and exit, what is the basis for closure and exit obligations under international law, what should closure and exit look like, who should be involved in these processes, and how should the social, environmental, economic and human rights challenges and impacts that arise from them be addressed? Read and download the report

Cosecha de sal en el Salar de Uyuni, Bolivia

November 13 2024 Climate Change, Human Rights, Freshwater Sources

Organizations and communities alert to human rights impacts of mineral extraction for the energy transition

A public hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights will focus on the impact of the expansion and intensification of extractive operations for transition minerals like lithium and copper on communities in Latin America. Washington DC. On November 15, at a public hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, representatives of national and regional organizations, as well as members of communities and indigenous peoples, will present updated information on how the exponential increase in the demand for and extraction of transition minerals has caused serious human rights violations as part of a transition process that is proposed only as a change in the energy matrix and is incapable of addressing inequalities in energy production and consumption, particularly in the Global South.Transition minerals like lithium, copper, cadmium, and cobalt—also called “critical” minerals—have been proposed in many global discussions as one of the main solutions to the climate crisis, as they are used in the development of technologies for the production of renewable energy, thus reducing or replacing the use of fossil fuels. A large part of these minerals are located in Latin America, in areas of great biocultural diversity.At the hearing, participants will present the main threats that mining for energy transition poses to the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, the right to a healthy environment, access to environmental information, citizen participation, and justice. In addition, concrete cases of human rights violations in the context of mining for energy transition will be presented through testimonies.These impacts are already occurring in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, which concentrate about 53 percent of the world's known lithium deposits in their Andean wetlands, extremely fragile ecosystems confronting water scarcity; in Chile and Peru, where 40 percent of the world’s copper is mined; and in the Colombian Amazon, where concessions, mining claims and illegal extraction of transition minerals are violating the rights of indigenous peoples.Several international organizations have spoken out about human rights abuses related to climate crisis response, particularly energy transition processes. In September, the UN Panel on Critical Minerals for Energy Transition issued a set of recommendations and voluntary principles for governments, industry and other stakeholders to ensure equitable, fair and sustainable management of these minerals. These guidelines aim to ensure that the transition to renewable energy is based on fairness and equity, and that it promotes sustainable development, respect for people, and environmental protection in developing countries.The hearing will take place during the 191st period of sessions of the Inter-American Commission. It was requested by the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), the Gaia Amazonas Foundation and the organizations that are members of the the Alliance for Andean Wetlands (Alianza por los Humedales Andinos): the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA), a regional organization; the Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN) and the PUCARÁ Assembly, of Argentina; the Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB) and the Colectivo de Derechos Humanos Empodérate, of Bolivia; ONG FIMA, Defensa Ambiental and Fundación Tantí, of Chile.The hearing will be held from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. (Washington DC time) and will be broadcast via Zoom, which requires prior registration at the following link: https://www.zoomgov.com/webinar/register/WN_dsEZdrDqSyOA8-i7ikveJQ#/registration. Quotes from representatives of organizations and communities Verónica Chávez, representative of the communities of Salinas Grandes and Laguna de Guayatayoc, Argentina:"All of us who are part of the Salinas Grande watershed are living a situation in which our rights are being affected. We hope that the IACHR can resolve this situation because it is very serious; they are damaging our territories, living beings, and nature itself." Liliana Ávila, director of the Human Rights and Environment Program at the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA):"The energy transition in our countries should be an opportunity to move towards more just and equitable energy production and distribution processes. The human rights framework and the role of the international protection system are fundamental in this regard. It is very important that the Inter-American Commission closely follows this process and promotes the protection of human rights." Verónica Gostissa, attorney with Asamblea Pucará of Catamarca, Argentina:"In our territory, the province of Catamarca, Argentina, we are living a serious violation of our rights, which is reflected first and foremost in the visible environmental impacts. Since 1997, lithium mining has caused significant environmental damage, including the drying up of a branch of the Trapiche River, a damage that persists to this day. Water continues to be taken from this damaged river, despite recognition of the damage by the company and government authorities. Access to public information, participation and consultation, and access to justice are also affected. For years, extractive projects have been approved without adequate procedures, and although a lawsuit filed by the Atacameños del Altiplano indigenous community resulted in a regulation, it does not meet the standards for effective indigenous consultation. In addition, more than 10 lithium projects are being developed in the same territory, the Salar del Hombre Muerto, without any cumulative and comprehensive impact assessment to date." Vivian Lagrava Flores, coordinator of the Colectivo de Derechos Humanos Empodérate, Bolivia:"Indigenous communities reject mining projects, they can even issue their resolutions and say no in the mining consultation process, but their decisions are not binding for governments. International standards are not respected, and the subjugation of territories and the imposition of mining rights are legitimized with discourses of progress and development, but it is not development from the vision of the indigenous peoples, nor from ours." Lady Sandón, representative of the Environment Unit of the Consejo de Pueblos Atacameños, Chile:"There is a lot of ignorance of the law for the native/indigenous people, which favors the state, and that is why the inhabitants of the land, by not knowing, do not enforce their guarantees. The state institutions violate the social, environmental, and cultural aspects; sometimes they use the indigenous people themselves to create divisions and to have supporters or political and mining operators who promote the change of the thinking of the genetic memory that we have as native people. I hope that we can revisit the situation of ancestral indigenous justice as a mechanism that previously established corrections so that the values and principles of ‘Buen Vivir’ are respected." Daniel Cerqueira, program director of the Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF):"This hearing is an opportunity for the Inter-American Commission to clarify the parameters of action for both States and companies in the management of transition minerals. It is imperative to have specific obligations in this area, as human rights violations resulting from the extraction of these minerals are a reality that tends to worsen in several countries in the region." Juan Sebastian Anaya, advocacy advisor at the Gaia Amazonas Foundation (Colombia):"The indigenous governments of the Amazon exercise their territorial and environmental authority in accordance with the Law of Origin, which guides their knowledge systems and principles of relationship with the elements of the territory, such as minerals. The decarbonization of the energy matrix to maintain consumption standards in the global north should not be done at the expense of indigenous territories and the communities that protect them, govern them and make them flourish with their daily practices."Press contactsVíctor Quintanilla (Mexico), AIDA, [email protected], +52 5570522107Rocío Wischñevsky (Argentina), FARN, [email protected], +54 91159518538 Karen Arita (Mexico), DPLF, [email protected], +52 442 471 9626

Declaración para la protección de los páramos y el bosque montano

October 30 2024 Climate Change, Indigenous Rights, Freshwater Sources

Declaration for the protection of the páramos and montane forests of the Tropical Andes

The undersigned civil society organizations, gathered in the framework of the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Cali, Colombia: 1.URGE States Parties to the CBD to adopt domestic regulations and make international commitments to:recognize the crucial role of the páramos and the montane forest that protects them in global water regulation, mitigation and adaptation to the climate crisis, as well as in the conservation of biocultural diversity;protect the human rights, traditional knowledge and sustainable practices of indigenous peoples and peasant and traditional communities that inhabit the páramos and montane forest; andprohibit large-scale mining or similar practices in paramos and montane forests in terms of their socio-environmental impacts, in accordance with the principles of precaution and prevention. 2. REQUEST the States to include in their national biodiversity strategies and action plans indicators and monitoring mechanisms before the CBD that allow them to adequately measure and report compliance with the commitments they assume to advance in the conservation of these ecosystems under the terms of this declaration, as well as to guarantee the rights of the peoples and communities that inhabit them. 3. REQUIRE States and multilateral financial institutions to mobilize sufficient resources and technical capacities to guarantee the conservation of these ecosystems, as well as the protection of the indigenous peoples and peasant and traditional communities that inhabit them. We submit these requests to the States Parties to the CBD: Taking into account that there is a scientific consensus on the water regulatory power of the páramo and montane forest ecosystems[1] because they not only host endemic flora that captures freshwater from rain and fog, supplying it to the Andean cities located downstream; but also soils, lake and peatland systems that have a high concentration of organic matter and an enormous capacity to retain the liquid. In addition, the páramos wetlands are high Andean wetlands[2] under the protection of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance.Recognizing that páramos and their montane forests are fundamental in the carbon cycle; that due to low temperatures and the slow rate of decomposition of organic matter present in them, their soils, vegetation and wetlands capture and retain carbon dioxide (CO2)[3], contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation and reducing the impact of meteorological events; and that these ecosystems are carbon sinks under the terms of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).Reminding that, due to their biological and climatic characteristics, these ecosystems provide essential services for the population and contain biodiversity that is subject to special protection[4] and are home to endemic and native species of flora and fauna such as frailejones, pajonales, epiphytes, the chivito hummingbird, the Andean condor and the Andean bear, among others.Considering that the indigenous peoples and peasant and traditional communities of the region manage and protect the páramos and montane forests, ensure the preservation of common goods in their territories and are guardians of ancestral knowledge that is crucial for the conservation of biodiversity; that the integrity of the páramos is fundamental for the conservation of these ancestral practicess[5]; and that the páramos and montane forests are reserves of biocultural diversity within the framework of the CBD.Reiterating that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)[6] warned of the impact of the climate crisis on páramos; and that they face other anthropogenic pressures such as fires, monocultures, livestock and invasive species[7].Warning that despite being strategic and sensitive ecosystems, deserving of the greatest protection, some of them are currently under strong pressure to develop large-scale mining projects, while others are at risk of being subject to mining concessions due to non-compliance with regulations and public policies that protect them or the lack of them.Bearing in mind that indigenous peoples and peasant and traditional communities have rejected these mining projects in their territories, even winning by majority vote "popular consultations" with which they have succeeded in defending the use of the land for traditional activities in their territories.Insisting that the removal of vegetation cover and the fragmentation of ecosystems generated by large-scale mining can affect the ecological balance, biocultural diversity and the provision of ecosystem services essential for life; acidify and reduce the amount of freshwater available for life systems; and break ecological and spiritual interconnectivity with other biomes and ecosystems, ending their capacity to capture carbon[8] and causing impacts in perpetuity.Following the warnings made by several UN rapporteurs and working groups on the negative impacts of mining on the environment and on human rights[9].Warning about certain dynamics recently employed by some mining companies in the countries of the region, particularly multinationals -such as the splitting of large mining titles, the change of exploitation method from surface to underground mining, as well as the formalization of small-scale miners in the area to outsource their activities by requesting multiple smaller areas-, which threaten to disguise large-scale mining processes with cumulative and synergistic environmental impacts on páramo ecosystems and montane forests that can be equal or more serious than those of a large-scale mining concession.Recalling that under the CBD States are required to: (i) monitor activities that have or are likely to have significant adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity[10], such as mining; (ii) establish protected areas for biodiversity conservation[11] based on the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and peasant and traditional communities[12]; and (iii) adopt emergency measures when there are serious and imminent risks to biological diversity from natural or other events[13], such as risk from extractive activities. Signed byCentro Sociojurídico para la Defensa Territorial Siembra (Colombia)Colectivo Socio-Ambiental Juvenil de Cajamarca COSAJUCA (Colombia)Comité para la Defensa del Agua y el Páramo de Santurbán (Colombia)Consejo Territorial de Cabildos de la Sierra Nevada de Gonawindua CTC (Colombia)Corporación Ecológica y Cultural Penca de Sábila (Colombia)Movimiento Socioambiental Kumanday (Colombia)Natural Seeds Alliance (Colombia)Proyecto Dulcepamba (Ecuador)⁠Acción Ecológica (Ecuador)Latinoamérica Sustentable (Ecuador)Unión de Defensores del Agua - UNAGUA (Ecuador)Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas y Campesinas del Azuay - FOA (Ecuador)Alianza de Organizaciones por los Derechos Humanos del Ecuador (Ecuador)Legal Defense Institute - IDL (Peru)Red Muqui (Perú)Red Internacional de Forestería Análoga - RIFA (Costa Rica)Mining Watch Canadá (Canada)Both ENDS (Netherlands)Redes del Agua Latinoamérica (Regional)Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense - AIDA (Regional)[1]Buytaert W. et al. Hidrología del páramo andino: propiedades, importancia y vulnerabilidad. Lovaina, U. de Lovaina, s.f.,, p. 10, 11, 23.[2] COP del Convenio de Ramsar, Resolución VIII.39. Los humedales altoandinos como sistemas estratégicos. Valencia, 2002.[3] Robert Hofstede et al. “Los páramos del Ecuador: Pasado, presente y futuro”, capítulo 12, págs 328 – 330, 2023[4] Robert Hofstede et al. págs 158 – 163, 2023.[5] IPBES (2018). The IPBES Regional Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services for the Americas. Recuperado de: https://www.ipbes.net/assessment-reports/americas[6] IPCC (2013). Panel Intergubernamental de Cambio Climático, Quinto Informe de Evaluación, Recuperado de: http://www.ipcc.ch/home_languages_main_spanish.shtml[7] Ochoa-Tocachi et al., 2016, Tomado de IPBES (2018).[8] Madriñán, S., Cortés, A. J., & Richardson, J. E. (2013). Páramo is the world's fastest evolving and coolest biodiversity hotspot. Frontiers in genetics, 192.[9] Asamble General de la ONU, (i) Relatoría Especial sobre derechos humanos y sustancias y desechos peligrosos. Asamblea General de la ONU. A/HRC/51/35, 8 de julio de 2022, (ii) Relatoría Especial sobre el derecho humano a un medio ambiente limpio, saludable y sostenible. A/79/270, 2 de agosto de 2024, (iii) Grupo de Trabajo sobre la cuestión de los derechos humanos y las empresas transnacionales. Asamblea General de la ONU. A/78/155, 11 de julio de 2023.[10] Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica, Art. 7.C.[11] Ibid. Art. 8.C. CDB.[12] Ibid. Art. 8.J CDB.[13] Ibid. Art. 14.E. CDB.